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INTRODUCTION

On April 19, 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of CentralBank v. FirstInterstateBank,' in which it held
by a 5-4 vote that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and
abetting action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 ("Exchange Act"). Section 10(b) is the principal weapon used by

1. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss1/1

2

Walker and Levine: The Limits of Central Bank's Textualist Approach-Attempts to Over
19971

THE LTMIH OFCENTRAL BANK

the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") to

combat fraud in the securities markets. Central Bank joined a welldeveloped body of Supreme Court cases decided over the last twenty-two

years narrowing the broad scope of section 10(b).3 Even in light of these
earlier decisions, the holding of CentralBank still "struck the securities
bar like a thunderbolt because it was so unexpected."4 Prior to Central
Bank, aiding and abetting had long been recognized by all the numbered
circuit courts of appeals.5 Indeed, the doctrine was so well-established

that Central Bank did not even raise the issue of whether there was a
private right of action for aiding and abetting in the lower courts.6
Perhaps as noteworthy as CentralBank's holding was the Court's
methodology in reaching its decision. Specifically, the Court utilized a
strict "textualist" approach which it took to new heights in defining what

conduct is prohibited by section 10(b). 7 The textualist approach mandates

3. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (holding that absent a duty to disclose, a
tippee's use of material nonpublic information does not violate section 10(b)); Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680,701 (1980) (holding that scienter is a required element of a section 10(b) action); Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (concluding that silence, absent a duty to disclose, does
not violate section 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (concluding
that absent deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, acts of corporate mismanagement do not
violate section 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that scienter
is a required element of a private section 10(b) action); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 731-33 (1975) (holding that a private action under Rule lOb-5 may only be brought
by actual purchasers or sellers of securities). But see United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,
2213-14 (1997) (upholding the misappropriation theory of insider trading); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (utilizing a flexible test for assessing materiality); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (dispensing with the need to prove reliance in
a material omission case); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14
(1971) (holding that a violation of section 10(b) gives rise to a private cause of action).
4. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 111, 119 n.13 (N.D. ILl), aff'd,
67 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1995).
5. See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); Levine
v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); K & S Partnership v. Continental Bank,
952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991); Fine
v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schliifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866
F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (lth Cir. 1988);
Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774,
777 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978).
6. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 8, Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854) (Nov. 30, 1993) ("We did not raise the issue of whether
there was a private right of action [for aiding and abetting] because it would have been
fruitless .... (statement of Central Bank's counsel)).
7. The opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, is consistent with the approach to statutory
interpretation of Justice Scalia, the leader in the Court's recent textualist movement. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990) (discussing the new textualist
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that legislative history be ignored if the meaning of the statute is plain.'
Resort to policy may be undertaken only to demonstrate that a textualist
approach "would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not

have intended it."9 Employing the textualist approach in CentralBank,
the Court stated that "the statutory text controls the definition of conduct

covered by § 10(b)."'" Because "'the language of Section 10(b) does not
in terms mention aiding and abetting,"' the Court ruled in favor of

Central Bank."
The Court's decision in CentralBank was influenced significantly
by two overlapping concerns. First, the Court does not favor implied
private rights of action and is likely to apply a textualist approach in
limiting such rights where they have previously been recognized.
Second, the Court was prompted by its belief that "'litigation under Rule
10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind
from that which accompanies litigation in general.""' 3
Although the express holding of CentralBank was narrow, it has
widely been cited in support of a multitude of broad propositions. A
creative defense bar has attempted to expand CentralBank's holding by
frequently asking courts to apply its textualist approach in cases
involving a variety of federal securities law provisions." A strict
movement led by Justice Scalia and noting that this approach is a "bold rethinking" of the Court's
traditional approach; the traditional approach aimed to implement the intent of the enacting Congress
and permitted the Court to seek guidance from legislative history and other sources).
8. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Where
the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative
intent.').
9. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 188 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191
(1991)).
10. Id. at 175.
11. Id. (quoting Anicus Curiae Brief for the SEC at 8, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854)).
12. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., concurring) ("[W]hen rights of action are judicially 'implied,' categorical
limitations upon their remedial scope may be judicially implied as well."); Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 190, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court has long since abandoned its
hospitable attitude towards implied rights of action.... [and] [i]f a change is to be made, we should
get out of the business of implied private rights of action altogether.').
Indeed, the Court recently limited its own holding in Central Bank and distinguished that
case from SEC enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions charging aiding and abetting
violations, where the right of action is express, stating "CentralBank's discussion concerned only
private civil litigation under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,
2203 (1997) (emphasis added).
13. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 189 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 739 (1975)).
14. See discussion infra Parts ll.B.1-6.
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textualist approach, however, is not well-suited to interpreting the federal

securities laws, which were intentionally drafted broadly to capture new

and unforeseen frauds 5 in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. 6 Defendants' efforts to use textualism to strike down or
narrow important enforcement rights and remedies have been, for the
most part, unsuccessful. Courts adjudicating securities law issues have
refused to adopt the narrow textual approach of Central Bank, except
with respect to section 10(b) conspiracy liability.'7 Defendants' Central
Bank challenges to the misappropriation theory of insider trading, 8 the
validity of SEC Rule 14e-3(a) (which prohibits trading on material
nonpublic information in the tender offer context), 9 certain core
elements of section 10(b) actions," and remedies available in Commission enforcement actions have all soundly been rejected.2 More
recently, in United States v. O'Hagan,22 even the Supreme Court
appears to have retreated from the approach used in Central Bank by

tempering its textual analysis of section 10(b) with an analysis of the
"animating purpose" of the federal securities laws.'

15. See Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and 8720 Before the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) ("Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not
devise any other cunning devices.'... Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent
manipulative devices I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The Commission
should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices." (statement of Thomas Gardiner
Corcoran, a drafter of the bill that became the Exchange Act)); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) ("Theol proscriptions [of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
thereunder] are broad and, by repeated use of the word 'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive.).
16. See Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1432 (1994)
(describing the Court's textualist approach in Central Bank as "legal fiction" as "[t]here is no
language in the text of the statute that clearly specifies [the scope of conduct prohibited by Section
10(b)]').
[The textualist approach] dictates that Congress must include every eventuality when
enacting a particular statute, or risk that the judiciary will hold that the statute fails to
encompass the relief requested, even if such relief is favorably viewed by that and
subsequent Congresses. Such a wooden construction ignores the realities of the political
process, demands a "crystal bal" approach from the Congress enacting the legislation,
ill serves a body as eminent as the Supreme Court, and frustrates the effectuation of
legitimate, if not sometimes noble, public policy objectives.
Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramiftcations of Recent U.S. Supreme CourtDecisionson Federaland State
Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 489, 496 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
17. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part II.B.1.
19. See infra Part II.B.3.
20. See infra Part ll.B.4.
21. See infra Part II.B.5.
22. 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
23. Id. at 2203.
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This Article attempts to chart the limits of Central Bank by
surveying the failed efforts to expand its textualist approach to other
areas of the federal securities laws. In Part I, we discuss the Court's
methodology in CentralBank and the opinion's scope. Part II focuses on
the reactions to CentralBank by Congress, the SEC, and litigants. This
section principally reviews those cases involving efforts to import the
textualist approach of CentralBank to other areas of the securities laws.
Based on the opinions in these cases, we analyze the express limits of
CentralBank. In Part HI,we conclude that CentralBank has proven not
to be a device suited to pruning the federal securities laws, and we
recommend that courts continue to confine Central Bank to its holding.24 This reading of Central Bank is consistent with O'Hagan, the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the statutory interpretation of the federal securities laws, and best serves the public interest by
keeping the broad remedial purposes of the securities laws paramount.
I.

CENTRAL BANK: THE DECISION

Over the years, the Supreme Court has rendered a number of
decisions establishing the elements of, and limitations on, civil actions
brought under the federal securities laws.' Many of these decisions
have had broad applicability.26 Others have had a narrower focus. The
issue addressed by the lower courts in Central Bank--the level of
scienter needed to establish aiding and abetting liability-was an issue
charged with potentially broad consequences, not just for aiding and
abetting actions, but for all other securities actions requiring proof of
scienter.' The issue addressed by the Supreme Court in CentralBank,
on the other hand, was of far narrower scope than the scienter issue
addressed in the lower courts. Even though CentralBank resulted in the
elimination of an entire cause of action, its holding produced greater
finality, leaving few loose ends. Notwithstanding the holding's relatively
24. See also Simon M. Lome, Central Bank of Denver v. SEC, 49 Bus. LAW. 1467, 1467
(1994) ("[A] decision reached by the Supreme Court by a decision of 5 justices against 4 justices
cannot 'clearly' or 'obviously' or 'unquestionably' stand for any proposition that is not explicitly
covered in the 5-vote majority opinion ... 'I.
25. See cases cited supra note 3; see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164,
170-78 (1994) (tracing the history of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in securities regulation). See
generally Steinberg, supra note 16 (discussing the implications of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in the field of securities regulation).
26. See CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 169-70; see also Steinberg, supra note 16, at 491.
27. See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 491-92.
28. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.
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limited scope and apparent finality, the Court's methodology served as
a platform for assaults on fundamental elements of the securities law.
A.

The Facts

The Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for two
separate bond issues sold in 1986 and 1988 by the Colorado Springs
Stetson Hills Public Building Authority ("Authority") to finance public
improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned community.29 The offerings
raised a total of $26 million." The bond covenants required the bonds
to be secured at all times by land having an appraised value of at least
160 percent of their outstanding principal and interest.3'
In January 1988, prior to the second offering, Central Bank received
an updated appraisal covering both the land securing the 1986 bonds and
the land proposed to secure the 1988 bonds.32 The updated appraisal
reported essentially unchanged land values. 3 The senior underwriter for
the 1986 offering notified Central Bank and expressed concern that the
160 percent requirement was not being met, as property values had been
declining and the appraisal was over sixteen months old.34 The underwriter further stated that "[i]t appears that.., the [Authority has] failed
to conform to the Bond Covenants to which they agreed."35
Central Bank's in-house appraiser proceeded to conduct a review of6
the updated appraisal and concluded that it indeed appeared optimistic.1
The appraiser suggested that Central Bank retain an outside appraiser to
conduct a new independent appraisal.37 After communicating with the
developer, the issuer, and others, Central Bank agreed to defer the
independent review until the end of 1988, approximately six months after
the 1988 bonds were to be sold.38 Before completion of the independent
appraisal, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds.39
The respondents, First Interstate Bank and Jack Naber, purchased

29. See id.at 167.

30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 894 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
36. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
37. See id. at 167-68.
38. See id. at 168.
39. See id.
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over two million dollars of the 1988 bonds.' After default, the respondents brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado against the Authority and the underwriters, alleging violations
of Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder. The complaint
also charged Central Bank with section 10(b) violations for "aiding and
abetting the fraud."'"
B. The Path to the Supreme Court
The district court entered summary judgment for Central Bank on
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue as to the
element of scienter. Specifically, the court determined that the plaintiffs
had not established a duty to disclose by Central Bank and held that in
the absence of such a duty, recklessness does not satisfy the scienter
requirement for aider and abettor liability.42 The plaintiffs could not
prove that Central Bank acted knowingly.43
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversedO4 The court agreed that
Central Bank owed plaintiffs no duty to disclose.45 The court, however,
viewed the case not as one of nondisclosure but rather as one involving
affirmative action by Central Bank by agreeing to delay the independent
appraisal until after completion of the offering. The court framed the
issue as follows: "[W]hen an alleged aider-and-abettor owes no duty to
plaintiffs, but takes affirmative action that assists the primary violation,
does recklessness satisfy the scienter requirement for aiding-and-abetting
liability?"' The court held that it did, and concluded that a trier of fact
could reasonably find Central Bank was reckless.47 Accordingly, the
court remanded the case.'
The Supreme Court granted Central Bank's petition for a writ of
certiorari, limited to the question of whether recklessness satisfied the
scienter element of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b)
where defendant's alleged wrongdoing consisted of affirmative action

40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 900 (10th Cir. 1992), revd sub nom.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
43. See id. at 899-900.
44. See id. at 904-05.
45. See id. at 900.
46. Id. at 902.
47. See id. at 903-04.
48. See i&. at 904-05.
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rather than silence.49 The Court, however, sua sponte, directed the
parties to brief the following question: "'Whether there is an implied
private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5?""'5
This latter question came as a surprise even though the Supreme
Court had twice previously reserved decision on the issue.51 The
existence of a private right of action for aiding and abetting had been
recognized by all numbered circuit courts of appeals,52 with the
first
53
such decision predating CentralBank by over a quarter-century.
C. The Majority' Ruling
The Supreme Court never reached the scienter question on which it
granted certiorari. Rather, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, in an
opinion written by Justice Kennedy, concluding "[b]ecause the text of
§ 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a private
plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)."'
The Court divided its prior cases interpreting section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 into two categories. The first category was comprised of those
cases where the Court determined the scope of conduct prohibited by
section 10(b), such as whether certain conduct constituted illegal insider
trading. Here, the textualist approach applied.55 The second category
included those cases where the defendant's conduct was prohibited by
section 10(b), but the Court had to decide collateral questions about the
elements of the lOb-5 private liability scheme, such as whether there was
a right to contribution. Here, the Court attempted to infer what Congress
would have intended had it enacted an express private right of action
under section 10(b).56
The Court classified the existence of a private right of action for
aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) in the first category.57

49. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 508 U.S. 959 (1993) (Order of Grant of
Certiorari); Brief for Respondents at i, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(No. 92-854).
50. CentralBank, 508 U.S. at 959.
51. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 & n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst

v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 & n.7 (1976).
52. See cases cited supra note 5.

53. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
54. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).

55. See id. at 173.
56. See id. at 178.
57. See id. at 175.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1

Seemingly turning its back on other interpretive tools, including analysis
of congressional intent and the policies underlying the securities laws, the
Court stated: "With respect [to] ... the scope of conduct prohibited by
' and "[t]hat bodes
§ 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision"58
ill for respondents, for 'the language of Section 10(b) does not in terms
mention aiding and abetting."' 59
Notwithstanding this vow of textual fidelity, policy concerns did
play a limited role in the Court's decision.' The Court stated "that it is
far from clear ... that the statutory purposes [of the Exchange Act]
would be furthered by the imposition of private aider and abettor
liability";" "[s]econdary liability for aiders and abettors exacts costs that
may disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities
markets";62 and "the rules for determining aiding and abetting liability
are unclear, in 'an area that demands certainty and predictability."'63 In
addition, the Court reiterated its concerns about vexatious litigation under
section 10(b) and the high cost of defense.' 4
Perhaps concerned that its opinion would not be read so broadly as
to exempt some categories of potential wrongdoers from liability, the
Court emphasized, in a statement which has since been seized upon by
a number of plaintiffs:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that

58. Id. at 173.
59. Id. at 175.
60. See id.at 188-90. Senator Christopher J. Dodd, during Congressional hearings following
the CentralBank decision, expressed his belief that a policy concern motivated the Supreme Court's
holding:
I also believe that we cannot pretend that th[e] issue [of aiding and abetting
liability] exists in a vacuum. It is clear that the Supreme Court's analysis in CentralBank
and other securities cases has been strongly swayed by a concern about the potential for
abuses of the private securities litigation system.
Abandonment of the PrivateRight ofAction for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud/StaffReport
on PrivateSecurities Litigation:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking,Hous. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 3 (1994) [hereinafter CentralBankHearing](opening
statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About
Rule 10b-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 865, 888 (1995)
("CentralBank rode a wave of anti-private litigation attitudes that has not yet broken and is now
being legitimized in legislation."); David S. Ruder, The Future ofAiding and Abetting and Rule
lob-5 After Central Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. LAw. 1479, 1485 (1994) (noting that the majority's
opinion "reflect[s] policy viewpoints and indicatets] that the Court is concerned with problems
related to large claim securities class actions").
61. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 189-90.
62. Id. at 188.
63. Id. (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
64. See id.at 189.
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secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability
under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer,
accountant or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a
material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5,
assuming5all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5
6

are met.

D.

The Dissent

Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens's
dissent. Justice Stevens dissented "for the simple reason that a 'settled
construction of an important federal statute should not be disturbed
unless and until Congress so decides."' 66 Justice Stevens also objected
to the majority's textualist approach and described the language of
section 10(b) as "encompassing" and "broad," and reminded that the
Supreme Court traditionally read section 10(b) "'flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes.""'67
Justice Stevens feared the potential breadth of the majority's
opinion:
The majority leaves little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even
permit the SEC to pursue aders and abettors in civil enforcement
actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.... Moreover, the majority's
approach to aiding and abetting at the very least casts serious doubt
both for private and SEC actions, on other forms of secondary liability
that like the aiding and abetting theory, have long been recognized by
the SEC and the courts but are not expressly spelled out in the
securities statutes.63
As Justice Stevens correctly anticipated, the battle lines were soon drawn
on the applicability of Central Bank to SEC enforcement actions and
other forms of secondary liability. Even Justice Stevens did not
anticipate, however, the extent to which defendants would try to expand
the majority's approach to other areas of the federal securities laws
unrelated to secondary liability.

65. Id. at 191.

66. Id. at 196 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
67. Id. at 198 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
68. Id. at 200 (citations omitted).
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I1. THE AFTERMATH

CentralBank had an immediate ripple effect, within both Congress
and the courts, that changed the existing landscape of federal securities
litigation. As perceived by one court, "with the decision in CentralBank,
the securities laws have undergone a significant transformation the results
of which will not be settled for many years., 69 The decision captured

attention not only because of its textualism, but also because it highlighted the importance of the dividing line between aiding and abetting and
primary liability. Three years later, however, sufficient returns are in
from lower courts to conclude that Central Bank had an effect more
limited than predicted by commentators.
A. Reaction by the Congress
The Central Bank opinion immediately captured Congress's
attention and revived interest in a previously stalled securities litigation
reform movement.' Twenty-three days after the Supreme Court issued
its opinion, the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing to examine the
opinion and its implications.7 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and several
members of the bar and academia testified.'
At the hearing, Central Bank was described as "catastrophic," 3
69. In re Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437, 439 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
70. The movement began in 1991 after the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis& Petigrowv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which held that private section 10(b) actions
must be brought within one year after discovery of the alleged violation, and no more than three
years after the violation occurred. See id. at 361-62. Hearings held by the 102d Congress to consider
the extension of the limitations period decreed by Lampf provided the initial forum at which
concems were raised about alleged abuses in the system of private litigation under the federal
securities laws. See SecuritiesInvestorProtectionAct of1991: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec.
ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking,Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. (1991); Securities Investors
Legal Rights: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin.ofthe House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 102d Cong. (1991).
71. See Central Bank Hearing,supra note 60.
72. Among those who testified at the Congressional hearings were Donald C. Langevoort, Lee
S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, see id. at 21-22, 52-56; Mark J.
Griffin, Director, Securities Division, Utah Department of Commerce, see id. at 22-24, 56-62; Stuart
J. Kaswell, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Securities Industry Association, see id. at
24-25, 64-69; Harvey J. Goldschmid, Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law,
see id. at 25-28, 69-72; Eugene I. Goldman, Partner, McDermott, Will & Emery, see id. at 28-30,
73-75; and David S. Ruder, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law and former
Chairman of the SEC, see id. at 30-45, 75-79.
73. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum).
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"'regrettable,'

74

and "a devastating blow."75 SEC Chairman Levitt ex-

pressed Commission support for legislation to clarify the availability of
aiding and abetting in Commission actions and for its restoration in

private actions. 76 He further testified that "at this time, we [the SEC]
will generally refrain from asserting aiding and abetting theories of
liability, where the statute does not expressly provide for such claims."'
Of the twelve persons present, only two believed that Central Bank
should not be overturned by the legislature.
Senators Dodd and Domenici questioned whether Congress should

consider merely inserting the words "aiding and abetting" into section
10(b) or rather, whether it should address Central Bank as part of a

74. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr.) (quoting Joel Seligman, Professor of
Law, University of Michigan School of Law).
75. Id. at 22 (statement of Mark J. Griffin, Director, Securities Division, Utah Department of
Commerce).
76. Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, stated:
Four years ago, this Subcommittee took a leading role in advancing the Remedies Act,
which greatly increased the strength and the flexibility of [the SEC's] enforcement
program. Congressional action is needed now to preserve the benefits of that legislation.
Legislation is also needed to restore aiding and abetting liability in private actions
which are a necessary supplement to [the SEC's] overall enforcement program.
Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 13.
78. The two were Senator Phil Gramm and Stuart J. Kaswell, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, Securities Industry Association.
Senator Gramm stated:
I believe [the Central Bank] decision is a decision moving us in the right direction.
So I think the Court has made an important decision. I think they have done it
for exactly the right reasons....
When we hamper the ability of the capital markets to work, we stick a knife in
the heart of the American economy. I'm very leery about knowingly allowing that to
happen.
Id. at 4-5. Later in the hearings, Stuart J. Kaswell presented the Security Industry Association's point
of view:
The Subcommittee is considering whether to enact legislation providing a private
right of action for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule lb-5. Our answer is an
unequivocal no.
After Central Bank of Denver, investors who are defrauded still have many
weapons against the bad apples. There is no gap that Congress must fill.
...The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver is both good law
and good policy. The securities laws fully protect those who are injured.
Id. at 24-25.
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comprehensive examination of the federal securities laws." These two
senators had previously introduced S. 1976, the "Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1994," but the bill had not advanced in
Congress."0
Senator Domenici used the hearings to rekindle interest in S. 1976
and the litigation reform movement. He stated:
I think waiting and delay on Dodd-Domenici is no longer a wise
option.... [I]f we're going to take a real look at [the CentralBank
decision, it is] not going to be done without a comprehensive examination of and strong movement on the Dodd-Domenici bill to clarify
significant aspects of securities class action litigation above and beyond
the Denver Bank case"
The Dodd-Domenici bill was not acted upon in committee and
expired with the 103d Congress."2 At the start of the next Congress,
Senators Dodd and Domenici reintroduced the bill as S. 240, the "Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995." ' By the end of the session,
and after a Congressional override of a presidential veto, a revised
version of the bill, revamping the conduct of private securities litigation,
became law.' Notably, the new law failed to restore aiding and abetting

79.

Specifically, Senator Domenici stated:

I submit [that writing language into the statute is] not very easy at all, because
as you now look at [section 10(b)], in order to define secondary liability, clearly we have
to have a clear definition of the primary violation. And that too is rather fuzy. The case
law is inconsistent. Predictive statement cases are but one example of this inconsistency.
To reverse the CentralBank of Denver decision we need to resolve what the appropriate
standard of care should be.
Id. at 5 (opening statement of Sen. Pete V. Domenici). To further amplify Senator Domenici's
statement, Senator Dodd stated that "[t]he mere insertion of [aiding and abetting] language in
[section 10(b)], in my view, is not enough. We've got to do a more comprehensive job if we're
going to do our job thoughtfully and responsibly as we look at this particular question." Id. at 6.
80. See id. at 6 ("[T]his is a very fortuitous hearing ... because we were ready to proceed
with a broader based bill, and perhaps some, who thought we could wait, in fact, some might have
thought we could wait forever on the Dodd-Domenici bill. I've heard that said before." (statement
of Sen. Pete V. Domenici)).
81. Id.
82. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The PrivateSecuritiesLitigation Reform Act
of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and
Lawyers, 51 BUs. LAW. 1009, 1018 (1996).
83. S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141 CONG. REC. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
84. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Reform Act made a number of
sweeping changes to the conduct of private securities litigation aimed at eliminating vexatious
litigation. Among these are: (1) a safe harbor for forward-looking statements such as forecasts or
projections, see id. § 102, 109 Stat. at 749-56; (2) a discovery stay pending decision on motions to
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in private securities actions. The law does make explicit, however, that
the Commission may bring enforcement actions against aiders and

abettors who act knowingly."
B. Reaction by the Defense Bar
While Congress was debating how to best respond to CentralBank,
the defense bar began testing its limits. The decision, however, has not
proven to be particularly elastic. While defendants were initially
successful in persuading two circuit courts to strike down the misappropriation theory of insider trading, relying on Central Bank to varying
degrees,86 a recent Supreme Court decision reversed the latter of these
cases (and rejected the reasoning of the earlier one) and upheld the
validity of the misappropriation theory.8 7 The only remaining area in the
federal securities laws where defendants have successfully extended

CentralBank's textualism is conspiracy liability.88

§ 101, 109 Stat. at 741, 747; (3) heightened pleading standards, see id.§ 101, 109
dismiss, see id.
Stat. at 741; (4) a system of proportionate, as opposed to joint and several, liability for non-knowing
violators, see id.§ 201, 109 Stat. at 758-62; and (5) a presumption that the plaintiff having the
largest financial interest in the case be appointed "lead plaintiff' and choose class counsel, see id.
§ 101, 109 Stat. at 738-39, 743-45. Whether these reforms would have made their way into law in
the absence of Central Bank is an open question. For a complete discussion of the Reform Act's
provisions, see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
PrivateSecuritiesLitigationReform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996), and Richard H. Walker
et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641
(1997).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (1994). CentralBank has not had a significant negative impact on
the Commission's enforcement program. The Commission already possessed express statutory
authority to bring aiding and abetting actions against registered entities and their associated persons.
See id. §§ 78o(b)(4)(E), 80a-9(b)(3), 80b-3(e)(5). The Commission also had the power to bring
cease-and-desist proceedings against any person who is a "cause" of another's primary violation,
although civil penalties are not available in such proceedings against those not regulated by the
Commission. See id. §§ 78u-3, 80a-9(f)(1), 80b-3(k)(1). Moreover, in SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276,
1284-87 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (No. 96-1883), the
Ninth Circuit held that the Reform Act's aiding and abetting provision applied retroactively to Fehn's
conduct. The court believed that since Feh acted prior to Central Bank,application of the Reform
Act provision to his conduct did not upset any settled expectations Feh might have had about his
The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to the Ninth Circuit. See
potential liability. See id.
SEC v. Fehn, 66 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (No. 96-1883).
86. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997);
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
87. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
88. Defendants have also achieved some success applying the reasoning of Central Bank to
preclude aiding and abetting charges under state blue sky provisions parallel to section 10(b). See
Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1994) (North Carolina blue sky law); Broadview
Fin., Inc. v. Entech Management Servs. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 444, 453 (D. Colo. 1994) (Colorado
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1. Challenge to the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
Probably the most significant, albeit temporary, judicial extension
of CentralBank's textualist approach came on August 2, 1996 when the
Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory of insider trading."

blue sky law); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 659 A.2d 1166, 1175-76 (Conn. 1995)
(Connecticut blue sky law); Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic, P.C. v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, Inc., 463
S.E.2d 600, 603-05 (S.C. 1995) (South Carolina blue sky law). But see Iowa v. Diacide Distribs.,
561 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1997) (allowing action for aiding and abetting violation of Iowa blue
sky law); South W. Okla. Dev. Auth. v. Sullivan Engine Works, Inc., 910 P.2d 1052, 1058-59 (Okla.
1996) (allowing action for aiding and abetting violation of Oklahoma blue sky law where statute
provides for action against those who participate or aid in the fraudulent sale); see also Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y v. American Bankers Ins. Co., No. 88-535-CIV-5-H, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10880, at *34 & n.5 (E.D.N.C. May 12, 1995) (allowing a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of
a fiduciary duty and stating "Central Bank's reach should not extend outside the statute construed
in that case"); Brunette v. Bristol Sav. Bank, No. CV 92-0453957S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2132,
at *5-6 (Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1994) (allowing a claim of aiding and abetting common law fraud
despite a Central Bank challenge).
Defendants have also had mixed results arguing that a Central Bank analysis precludes
claims of aiding and abetting RICO violations, Some courts have agreed with defendant's assertions
that there can be no private right of action for aiding and abetting RICO violations. See Kaiser v.
Stewart, No. CIV.A.96-6643, 1997 WL 476455, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1997); In re American
Honda Motor Co. Dealerships Relations Litig., 965 F. Supp. 716, 723 (D. Md. 1997); Hayden v.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 955 F. Supp. 248,255-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lasalle Nat'l
Bank v. Duff& Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071, 1088-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Lake
State Commodities, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1461, 1475 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Department of Econ. Dev. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449, 468, 475-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Other courts have disagreed with defendant's assertions holding that, notwithstanding CentralBank, a private right of
action for aiding and abetting RICO violations does exist. See American Automotive Accessories,
Inc. v. Fishman, No. 95-C5156, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12207, at *17-18 (N.D. I1. Aug 21, 1996);
Schuylkill Skyport Inn, Inc. v. Rich, No. 95-3128, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12655, at *108-10 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 20, 1996); Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3427, at *19 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1996); 131 Main St. Assoc. v. Manko, 897 F. Supp.
1507, 1529 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Succession of Wardlaw v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, No.
CIV.A.94-2026, 1994 WL 577442, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1994); Clark v. Milam, 872 F. Supp.
307, 317 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
89. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617. The theory had been previously accepted by three circuits.
See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1981). Arguably, the Third Circuit had
also adopted the misappropriation theory. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822-23 (3d
Cir. 1985).
The misappropriation theory had been rejected in 1995 by the Fourth Circuit in UnitedStates
v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933,944(4th Cir. 1995). CentralBank was not pivotal to the decision in that case,
however. Nowhere in his briefs did Bryan cite to CentralBank. In fact, of the more than 80 pages
of text constituting Bryan's opening and reply briefs, only four buried sentences challenged the
validity of the misappropriation theory. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 43, United States v. Bryan,
58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-5124) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). Bryan mainly
made evidentiary challenges in attempting to overturn his conviction. See id. at 1 ("The trial court
should have entered judgment of acquittal... as there was no evidence that... Bryan, violated any
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The damage was quickly undone, however, when the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit decision in O'Hagan and
upheld the validity of the theory.9
The misappropriation theory allows the SEC to proceed against
persons who are not insiders of the company whose stock they are
trading.91 Under this theory, an insider trading violation occurs when a
person trades on confidential information obtained in breach of a duty of
trust and confidence.92 In such cases, the trader does not owe a duty to
the shareholders of the traded stock.93 Instead, the trader has another
relationship that has provided access to the confidential information.94
The validity of the misappropriation theory is a question concerning the
scope of section 10(b) that, according to CentralBank, must be judged

law, statute or binding regulation ... with respect to [the contracts at issue] ...

.").

To the extent

he asserted that the misappropriation theory was invalid, he argued that the theory was void for
vagueness, not that it could not be squared with the text of section 10(b). See id. at 43 ("[W]ith
respect to the misappropriation theory of insider trading, there is the serious question of whether the
theory itself ... is so ill-defined and incomplete as to be subject to the void for vagueness
doctrine... " (citations omitted)).
The Fourth Circuit, in reversing the conviction, struck down the misappropriation theory. See
Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944. As a foundation for its decision, the court looked to CentralBank for the
"admonition" that "the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against expanding the concept of fraud
in the securities context beyond what the words of the Act reasonably will bear." Id. at 945. The
court, however, did not employ a textualist analysis in the manner of CentralBank. Rather, the court
surveyed Supreme Court case law, focusing on two cases in particular, Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that section 10(b) does not prevent breaches of fiduciary duty
without an accompanying misrepresentation or omission), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that only purchasers and sellers may bring a section 10(b)
action), to conclude:
In light of the [Supreme] Court's consistent interpretation of section 10(b) as
prosenibing only the deception, by material misrepresentation or omission, of a purchaser
or seller of securities, Or of a person in some way connected with or having a stake in
an actual or proposed-purchase or sale of securities, we believe that the misappropriation
theory cannot be defended.
Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949. The Bryan court further stated that, because the misappropriation theory could
apply to situations involving a'mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of trust
and confidence," (with no element of deception), the theory could not be reconciled with Santa Fe.
Id.
90. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213-14.
91.

See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 2.02[6],

at 2-16 to -17 (1997); Gregory S. Crespi, TheAvailabilityAfterCarpenter ofPrivateRights ofAction
UnderRule 1Ob-5 Based upon the Misappropriationoflnformation ConcerningAcquisitions, 26 AM.
Bus. L.J. 709, 709-10 (1989).
92. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 91, § 2.02(6), at 2-16 to -17; Crespi, supra note 91, at
710.
93. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 91, § 2.02(6), at 2-17.
94. See id.
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against the language of the statute."
2. O'Hagan
James Herman O'Hagan was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney,
counsel for Grand Metropolitan PLC in connection with the planning of
a tender offer for the common stock of Pillsbury Company. 6 O'Hagan
was not one of the Dorsey attorneys assigned to the General Metropolitan
transaction.9 7 Through his position at Dorsey, however, he learned of the
tender offer and made large purchases of Pillsbury securities." Grand
Metropolitan's announcement of the tender offer caused Pillsbury's stock
price to soar." O'Hagan sold his securities, reaping a profit of more
than four million dollars, which he used to replenish funds he had
previously stolen from a number of his Dorsey clients.' O'Hagan was
criminally convicted on fifty-seven counts arising from his Pillsbury
transactions.' Seventeen of these counts were based on the misappropriation theory of insider trading.'
In his brief to the Eighth Circuit challenging the validity of the
misappropriation theory, O'Hagan relied extensively on the textualist
approach of CentralBankCentralBank, NA. v. FirstInterstate Bank, N.A.... totally undercuts
the Government's legal theory.
Just as the text of Section 10(b) does not mention aiding and
abetting, the text does not mention inside traders or outside traders,
much less the misappropriation theory upon which the Government
relies in this case. And as the Supreme Court explained in Central
Bank, with regard to the scope of conduct, "the text of the statute
controls our decision." To paraphrase Central Bank, if Congress
intended Section 10(b) to cover insider trading "we presume it would
have used
the words [insider] ...and [trading] ...in the statutory
03
text.'

95. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1994).
96. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Seek!.
103. Brief of Appellant at 43-44, United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (No.
94-3714MNMI) [hereinafter O'Hagan 8th Cir. Brief] (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (on
file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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O'Hagan's literalist reading of section 10(b) proved too much a stretch.
A strict textual reading of section 10(b) would not only invalidate the
misappropriation theory, but would eviscerate insider trading liability
altogether. The Supreme Court, however, expressly recognized that at
least some forms of insider trading violate section 10(b).' O'Hagan
also separately argued that the text of section 10(b) requires a breach of
a duty to shareholders of the company whose securities were traded (as
opposed to a duty to the source of the misappropriated information) for
a violation to occur. 5
With one judge dissenting, the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's
conviction.' 6 The court began its opinion with citations to Central
Bank for the following propositions: "In construing the scope of conduct
that may be regulated under § 10(b), the Supreme Court has definitively
ruled that the text of the statute is dispositive, ' 7 and "Rule lOb-5
fraud cannot prohibit conduct that does not amount to § 10(b) deception."' ° The court stated that it would judge the validity of the misappropriation theory "against this backdrop."'0 9
In doing so, the court held that the theory was not valid because, in
its view, the theory imposes liability upon a breach of a fiduciary duty
without a showing of a misrepresentation or omission, and in any event,
the fraud in a misappropriation case is not "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security.10 Since the trader's duty is not owed to
parties to the securities transaction or other market participants, the court
held that the connection between the breach of duty and the resultant
securities transaction was too tenuous.'' The court cited CentralBank
extensively throughout its opinion. In particular, the court noted that
adopting the government's view that the "in connection with" prong was
satisfied, even though no market participant was defrauded, "simply
cannot be reconciled with the Central Bank holding that the text of

104. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (confirming the Chiarellaformation of
"tipper-tippee" liability for insider trading, yet rejecting it where the tipper's fiduciary duty cannot
be traced to the target corporation); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (noting that an
insider trading violation occurs under section 10(b) where a tipper breaches his or her fiduciary duty
by passing on inside information to a tippee who subsequently trades on the information).
105. See O'Hagan 8th Cir. Brief, supra note 103, at 51-52.
106. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 613-14.

107. Id. at 616 (citing Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994)).
108. Id. at 615 (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173).

109. Id. at 616.
110. Seeid. at618.
I1l. Seeid.
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§ 10(b) governs the scope of conduct which may be regulated under that
provision....
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld the
misappropriation theory in a 6-3 decision."1 Notably, the majority
discussed the relevance of Central Bank only once in reference to a
peripheral point in the Eighth Circuit's decision. Specifically, the Eighth
Circuit had relied on dictum from CentralBank to hold that "[section]
10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers
and sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely."".. The Court
concluded that the Eighth Circuit had misconstrued this dictum."5 The
Court appeared to go out of its way to emphasize the narrow scope to
which Central Bank might be confined, taking the opportunity to note
that "Central Bank's discussion concerned only private civil litigation
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, not criminal liability."".6 Even more
striking is the fact that the dissents by Justice Thomas". and Justice
Scalia" 8 did not mention Central Bank at all.
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit, the Court found that the misappropriation theory does require proof of a deceptive device or contrivance." 9 When a person feigns loyalty to the principal, while actually
converting information belonging to the principal for personal use, this
element is satisfied. 2 The Court next concluded that the "in connection
with" element is also satisfied because the trader's fraud is consummated
not when he misappropriates the information, but rather, when he trades
on such information.' Finding that the misappropriation theory was
faithful to the text of the statute, the Court therefore held that "tihe
misappropriation at issue here was properly made the subject of a § 10(b)

112. Id. at 619.
113. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214 (1997). Justices Scalia and Thomas
concurred in part and dissented in part with separate opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in
Justice Thomas's opinion.
114. Id. at 2213.
115. Seek.

116. Id.
117. Justice Thomas believed that the misappropriation theory does not satisfy section 10(b)'s
"in connection with" requirement because it lacks a "coherent and consistent interpretation." Id. at
2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

118. Justice Scalia focused on the words of the statute and concluded that, at least in a criminal
case, the "unelaborated statutory language" requires that the person being manipulated or deceived

be a party to the securities transaction. Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See id.
at 2208.
120. See ki.
121. See k. at 2209.
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charge because it meets the statutory requirement that there be
'deceptive' conduct 'in connection with' the securities transaction.""'
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, employed policy analysis,
presumably as a check against a bizarre result. Justice Ginsburg
concluded that it would make "scant sense" to hold O'Hagan liable if his
law firm represented the target (where he would be liable under the
classical theory of insider trading as a temporary insider), but not if it
represented the bidder." Notably, the majority opinion went on to
consider additional broad policy considerations that seemed to go beyond
testing whether the textualist approach would lead to an overly bizarre
result. The Court stated that "[t]he theory is also well-tuned to an
animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.""2 The Court
detailed how investors would be hesitant to invest in a rigged market."z
Because of the Court's consideration of policy factors in addition to the
text of the statute, the bar characterized O'Hagan as "reminiscent of the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws
in the 1960s and early 1970s.""a
O'Hagan confirms that Central Bank has not ushered in the
revolution in the interpretation of the securities laws that some have
proclaimed. 27 The mere fact that a specific fraudulent practice, such as
insider trading, is not literally prohibited by the text of section 10(b) does
not mean, under CentralBank, that the practice does not violate section
10(b)'s broad prohibition against manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances. O'Hagan thus establishes the first broad limit on Central
Bank. Simply put, textualism does not require literalism. As long as
defendant's conduct reasonably comes within the flexible language of
section 10(b), CentralBank will not shield that defendant from liability
simply because the conduct has historically been described in specific

122. Id. at 2211.
123. See id.
at 2210-11.
124. Id. at 2210 (citing Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (1980) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240)).
125. See id. at 2210.
126. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis, SecuritiesLaw, NAT'L L., Aug. 4, 1997, at B4
(discussing the affirmance of the misappropriation theory in O'Haganand citing Superintendentof
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), and SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963), as examples of the Court's liberal interpretations of the
securities laws). Messrs. Pitt and Groskaufimanis also believe that the O'HaganCourt "[a]bandon[ed]
[its] literalist reading of the federal securities laws." Pitt & Groskaufinanis, supra, at B4.
127. See, e.g., Seligman,supra note 16, at 1434-37 (arguing that CentralBank would preclude
SEC claims of aiding and abetting, respondent superior, and conspiracy under section 10(b)).
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language not found in the statute.
3. Challenge to SEC Rule 14e-3(a)
O'Hagan also relied on CentralBank to challenge the validity of his
convictions under Rule 14e-3(a). 25 Even though Central Bank was
extensively relied upon by O'Hagan, the Supreme Court did not cite the
opinion in the course of its Rule 14e-3 discussion. Arguably, this
suggests a possible second limit of CentralBank-it has no application
outside the section 10(b) context.
Rule 14e-3(a) states that it is illegal for a person to trade in the
securities of a company that is the target of a tender offer if the person
has received knowledge of the tender offer from a person associated with
either the target or bidding company.'29 A breach of a duty by the
trader is not an element of the violation. 3 The rule has been a linchpin
in the SEC's
fight against insider trading in connection with tender
1
offers.

13

The SEC's authority to promulgate the Rule is found in section
14(e) of the Exchange Act. This section directs the SEC to "define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent.., acts and practices
[that] are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative," in connection with a
did not
tender offer.32 Three circuits have held that the Commission
3
exceed its rulemaking authority when promulgating the rule.
O'Hagan argued to the Eighth Circuit:
Central Bank makes clear that the substantive text of the statute
determines the scope of prohibited conduct. The substantive text of
Section 14(e) is the prohibition of "fraudulent, manipulative, and
deceptive acts." 'Fraudulent practices" in this context involve a breach

128. See Brief for Respondent at 34-35, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997) (No.
96-842) [hereinafter O'Hagan S. Ct. Brief for Respondent] (arguing that the plain language of
section 14(e) is controlling and that the SEC exceeded its statutory mandate when it promulgated
Rule 14e-3) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
129. See 17 C.F.R § 240.14e-3(a) (1997).
130. See id.
131. For example, violations of the Rule were charged in some of the Commission's most
celebrated insider trading cases of the 1980s. See In re Martin A. Siegel, Exchange Act Release No.
24,098, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,123 (Feb. 13, 1987); In re Ivan F.
Boesky, Exchange Act Release No. 23,802, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC-)
92,991 (Nov. 14, 1986); In re Dennis B. Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 23,300, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,761 (June 5, 1986).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
133. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165
(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1991).
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of a duty to disclose. If one were to accept Chestman s conclusion that
the rulemaking provision in Section 14(e) permits the SEC to redefine
"fraudulent practices" to exclude the requirement of a breach of duty
to disclose, then the prohibited conduct would no longer be determined
text of the statute. This is impermissible under
by the substantive
4
Bank.1
Central
O'Hagan maintained that it was logical to resort to CentralBank's
section 10(b) textualist approach when examining section 14(e) because
the latter "is modeled upon the antifraud provision of section 10(b)."' 35
The government countered that Rule 14e-3(a) qualifies as a means
"reasonably designed to prevent" instances of fraudulent conduct and,
therefore, can reach conduct that itself does not meet the elements of
common law fraud.' The Eighth Circuit, believing that the statute only
allows the SEC to regulate acts and practices that the law already deems
fraudulent, agreed with O'Hagan and struck down Rule 14e-3(a).' 37
O'Hagan invoked Central Bank again in opposition to the
government's petition for certiorari, going so far as to use the case to
argue that no conflict exists among the circuits: "Because the court below
is the only court of appeals to analyze Rule 14e-3 in light of Central
Bank, the issue of whether the Rule survives Central Bank is not yet
suitable for review by this Court. '13' After certiorari was granted,
the Central Bank arguments he presented in the
O'Hagan reiterated
139
Circuit.
Eighth
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit."4 The Court held
that Rule 14e-3(a) is a means reasonably designed to prevent trading on
the basis of material, nonpublic information in the tender offer setting
and, as a prophylactic measure, can encompass conduct that is
nonfraudulent. 4' Significantly, the Court did not even address
O'Hagan's Central Bank arguments, much less cite to Central Bank,

134. O'Hagan 8th Cir. Brief, supra note 103, at 54 (citation omitted).

135. Id. at 52 (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) ("Section 14(e)
adds a 'broad antifraud prohibition,' modeled on the antifraud provisions of § 10(b) of the Act and
Rule 10b-5 ...." (citation omitted) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24

(1977))).
136. See Brief of Cross-Appellant at 55-56, United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir.

1996) (No. 94-3714MNMI) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
137. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627.
138. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 28, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)
(No. 96-842) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

139. See O'Hagan S. Ct. Brief for Respondent, supra note 128, at 33-44.
140. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2220.

at 2219.
141. See id.
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even though the validity of Rule 14e-3(a) depended upon the Court's
interpretation of the scope of its authorizing statute, section 14(e). The
Court's disregard of Central Bank in analyzing the scope of section
14(e), a parallel antifraud provision to section 10(b), provides a strong
basis for concluding that the Court does not believe Central Bank
extends beyond section 10(b) and its narrow holding thereunder.
4. Challenges to Core Elements of Section 10(b)
Aside from using Central Bank unsuccessfully to challenge the
misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3(a), defendants have attempted to
use the case to narrow both the "in connection with" and scienter
requirements of section 10(b)." These arguments, however, have been
uniformly rejected." The decisions in these cases mark CentralBank's
third limit. The case holds only that, in a section 10(b) action, where the
text is wholly unambiguous in determining the scope of conduct
prohibited, the text both begins and ends the inquiry. Where the text
alone is not determinative, however, CentralBank has no bearing.
a. The "In Connection With" Requirement
For primary liability to attach under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
the plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant's fraudulent actions4
took place "in connection with" the purchase or sale of any security.'
The precise contours of the "in connection with" requirement, however,
are not apparent from the text of the statute itself.
In the seminal case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second
Circuit interpreted the "in connection with" requirement broadly and held
that false and misleading statements are made "in connection with"
securities trading "whenever [such] assertions are made.., in a manner
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.', 4' The Texas
Gulfcourt further stated that this standard can be met whether or not the
maker of the statement is a buyer or seller in the underlying securities
transactions.'" The standard is necessary to safeguard the integrity of
statements by nonparties to a securities transaction, such as statements by

142. See infra Part ll.B.4.

143. See infra notes 151, 192 and accompanying text.
144. See 2 THOMAs LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEcUR1TIS REGULATION § 13.2.2
(3d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1997).
145. 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968).

146. See id. at 860.
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the corporation itself or its auditors. 47 Such statements are regularly
taken into account by market participants and reflected in the prices of
securities."' Accordingly, every other circuit to have addressed the

issue has adopted the Texas Gulf interpretation of the "in connection
with" requirement. 49 The Supreme Court similarly provided an expansive

interpretation of this element."'
In four reported cases, the defense argued that Central Bank's
textualist approach effectively overruled Texas Gulf and its progeny."'
In each case, the defendants attempted to constrict the class of persons
subject to section 10(b) liability by narrowing the interpretation of the "in

connection with" element.'

Finding that the Texas Gulfinterpretation

is compatible with the language of section 10(b), all four courts have

rejected this argument.'53
In McGann v. Ernst & Young,"5 the plaintiffs alleged that Ernst

& Young, as outside auditor for Community Psychiatric Centers, issued
a false and misleading audit opinion attesting to the accuracy of
Community's financial statements, with knowledge that it would be
included in Community's Form 10-K.'55 The plaintiffs alleged that
although Ernst's opinion was not distributed to potential investors, it

147. See id at 860-61.
148. See id. at 858-59.
149. See SEC v. Rana Research, 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1993); Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc.,
959 F.2d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1992); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101-02 (10th Cir. 1971); Gottlieb v. Sandia Arn
Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 516 (3d Cir. 1971); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1971).
150. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) ("The
crux of the present case is that Manhattan Casualty Company suffered an injury as a result of
deceptive practices touchingits sale of securities as an investor." (emphasis added)).
The Court recently reaffirmed that expansive view of the "in connection with" element when
it rejected the defense's argument in O'Haganthat this element requires that the deception must be
"intended to induce action or inaction by purchasers and sellers of securities, or other market
participants, involved in a particular securities transaction.' O'Hagan S. Ct. Brief for Respondent,
supra note 128, at 26 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir.
1995)).
151. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1460 (1997); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
In re Leslie Fay Cos., 871 F. Supp. 686, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Spear v. Ernst & Young, No.
CIV.A.3:94-1150-17, 1994 WL 585815, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994).
152. See McGann, 102 F.3d at 393; Silicon Valley, 884 F. Supp. at 1402; Leslie Fay, 871 F.
Supp. at 695; Spear, 1994 WL 585815, at *5.
153. See McGann, 102 F.3d at 396; Silicon Valley, 884 F. Supp. at 1402; Leslie Fay, 871 F.
Supp. at 697; Spear, 1994 WL 585815, at *7.
154. No. SA CV 93-814 AHS,1995 WL 852119 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1995), rev'd, 102 F.3d
390 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1460 (1997).
155. See id. at *1.
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contributed to Community's stock price trading at artificially inflated
prices during the class period.5 6 The United States District Court for
the Central District of California granted Ernst's summary judgment
motion, holding that on these facts, the "in connection with" requirement
of section 10(b) had not been met.'57 The court accepted Ernst's
argument that Texas Gulf and its progeny were no longer good law after
Central Bank as these cases improperly rested on the "policies and
purposes regarding the 1934 Act," rather than the text of section
10(b)."' The court concluded, without further analysis, that Ernst's
actions did not satisfy the "in connection with" requirement.'59 While
not clearly expressed, it appears that the court found determinative the
fact that the auditor's opinion, which was filed with the SEC, was not
included in any offering document.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Ernst reiterated that Central Bank
ended "[t]he heyday of Texas Gulf Sulphur and like policy-driven
decisions.""e Ernst attempted to redefine "in connection with" as
follows:
The statutory text couples the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" with the phrase "to use or employ any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." The dictionary
definitions of the verbs "to use" and "to employ" denote positive
action....
Moreover, section 10(b) refers in the singular to "the purchase or
sale" of securities (rather than "a"or "any" purchase or sale). The most
natural meaning is that the defendant must act in connection with a
particularsecurities transaction. Read plainly, the text thus indicates

156. See id.
at *2-3.
157. See id.
at *8-9.
158. Id. at *7.This same argument was made in Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F.
Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Silicon shareholders alleged that Deloitte & Touche, Silicon's auditor,
caused or permitted Silicon to issue false and misleading financial reports in violation of section
10(b). See id. at 1399. In moving to dismiss, Deloitte similarly argued that Central Bank rejected
the policy-based approach underlying the broad view of the "in connection with" requirement. See
i at 1402. Deloitte contended that after CentralBank, the only statements that may satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement are those found in "'selling documents,' i.e. documents used by either
sellers or purchasers of securities to effect a particular sales transaction." Id.
The Northern District of California was not, however, persuaded. It held that CentralBank
could not be used to alter the expansive view of the "in connection with" requirement as Central
Bank decided a "limited issue" and "did not even discuss the 'in connection with' requirement, much
less interpret that clause to exclude from 10(b) liability the conduct of non-traders." Id.
159. See McGann, 1995 WL 852119, at *7.
160. Answering Brief of Appellee Ernst & Young LLP at 16, McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102
F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-55925) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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that liability under section 10(b) is limited to defendants who take
action with respect to particularsecurities transactions. Plaintiffs allege
no such action by Ernst & Young, who merely submitted an audit
opinion
to a client, who then filed it in a routine regulatory Form
61
10-K.

The Commission filed an amincus curiae brief arguing that the Texas
Gulfconstruction of the "in connection with" requirement remains good
law after CentralBank." The Commission pointed out that the Texas
Gulf court based its decision on the broad catchall language found in
section 10(b), the absence of any limiting language in section 10(b) often
found in other antifraud provisions, and legislative history demonstrating
that the provision was meant to be sweeping in scope." The Commission stressed that this mode of statutory analysis fully complied with
CentralBank. 64
McGann was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 65 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that "reports of Texas Gulfs demise are greatly exaggerated.
There is no tension between the holding of CentralBank and the holding
of Texas Gulf ... ."" The court ruled that the textualist approach of
CentralBank does not undermine Texas Gu/fbecause "[o]n its face, [the]
language [of section 10(b)] does not limit liability to those who actually
trade securities."' 67
In Spear v. Ernst & Young, 6 ' Ernst tried to take the argument one
step further to attain a blanket exemption for auditors in section 10(b)

161. Id. at 17.
162. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 8-11, McGann

v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-55925) (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review).
163. See id. at 9-10.
164. See d. at 9.
165. See McGann, 102 F.3d at 397.
166. Id. at 393.
167. Id. The court also applied structural and policy analyses. In undertaking the structural

analysis, the court took note of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act
sections 17(a) and 15, which contain explicit language requiring the defendant to be a participant
in the securities transaction. See id. at 394-95. The court thus agreed with the statement in Texas
Gulf that "'when Congress intended that there be a participation in a securities transaction as a

prerequisite of a violation, it knew how to make that intention clear."' Id. at 394 (quoting SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)). Lastly, from a policy

standpoint, the court concluded that the position advocated by Ernst & Young was inconsistent with
the "broad remedial goals" of the securities laws as "[i]t would exempt from the remedial breadth
of§ 10(b) a broad range of misinformation and market manipulation, so long as the perpetrators did

not buy or sell securities in connection therewith." Id. at 396.
168. No. CIV.A.3:94-1150-17, 1994 WL 585815 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994).
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actions.'69 Plaintiffs, shareholders of Policy Management Systems
Corp., alleged that Ernst was primarily liable under section 10(b) for
preparing faulty audit reports.' 7 ° The defendants argued that Central
Bank "represents a watershed decision which implicitly overturns
established precedents allowing Section 10(b) liability to attach to
auditors" because "a natural reading of ['in connection with'] is that
liability extends only to persons who engage in fraud and purchase or
sell securities.."171
The District Court of South Carolina rejected this argument. First,
the court noted that even the Central Bank decision recognized that
accountants may be liable as primary violators in section 10(b) actions
assuming all the elements of a cause of action are met.' The court
also noted that the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the "in connection
with" requirement to extend to transactions "touching" the purchase or
sale of securities. 73 Lastly, the Spear -court found convincing that
section 10 broadly applies to "any person" whereas other sections, such
as section 12, expressly limit the class of potential defendants.
Finally, in In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Securities Litigation, the
Southern District of New York rejected a similarly expansive argument
posed by BDO Seidman, Leslie Fay's independent auditor. BDO argued
that because the alleged false statements were only made in documents
filed with the SEC and not readily available to investors, CentralBank
mandated that the false statements were not actionable because they were
not made "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security.7 6 The
argument failed to recognize that the central purpose of filing offering

169. See id. at *5.
170. See id. at *2.
171. Id. at *5. Ernst suggested that plaintiffs' only remedies after Central Bank against

nonsellers and nonpurchasers are those provided by state law and Exchange Act section 18, which
provides relief for misrepresentations in documents filed with the SEC. See Memorandum of Ernst
& Young in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 21 n.14, Spear v. Ernst & Young, 1994
WL 585815 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994) (No. 3-94-1150-17) [hereinafter Ernst & Young Motion to
Dismiss] (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

172. See Spear, 1994 WL 585815, at *6.
173. See id. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14

(1971)).
174. See id.
175.

871 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

176. See id. at 694.
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documents with the SEC is to provide information to investors, either
directly or by dissemination via analysts.177
The court stated that a textualist approach does not foreclose BDO's
liability given the ambiguous nature of the phrase "in connection
with.""' Instead, the court chose to continue to interpret the requirement broadly. The court rejected as unfounded BDO's attempt to expand
CentralBank into the "in connection with" province:
Acknowledging [the] broad remedial purpose [of section 10(b)], and
hence the endless variety of factual situations that § 10(b) was meant
to address, the Supreme Court has admonished that courts should read
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "flexibly, not technically and restrictively."
Central Bank did not alter thisfundamental tenet.
CentralBank merely held that courts should not expand a § 10(b)
implied cause of action to reach conduct completely outside its textual
authority .... That does not mean that courts should not flexibly read
the text itself to cover conduct within § 10(b)'s textually supported
purposes, however. Absent such flexibility, § 10(b) could not address
the realities of today's complicated securities markets. That cannot be
what Congress intended.'79
In sum, these cases make clear that CentralBank does not alter the
traditional methods of analyzing the reach of the "in connection with"
element of section 10(b). The phrase is inherently fuzzy at its outer edges
and is best interpreted in a manner that will achieve the statute's broad
remedial goals.
b. The Scienter Requirement and Recklessness
A second area in which the text of section 10(b) does not spell out
the precise parameters for maintaining an action is the state of mind
required to establish scienter. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,"° the
Supreme Court defined scienter to include "knowing or intentional

177. Recognizing this, the Second Circuit stated:
The dominant congressional purposes underlying the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 were to promote free and open public securities markets and to protect the investing
public from suffering inequities in trading, including, specifically, inequities that follow
from trading that has been stimulated by the publication of false or misleading corporate
information releases.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
178. See Leslie Fay,871 F. Supp. at 695.
179. Id. at 696 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
180. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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misconduct," but expressly reserved the question of "whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5..'' . Since the Ernst decision, every circuit court
to consider the question has held that recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement.'2
Defendants were quick to invoke CentralBank to argue that reckless
conduct does not satisfy the scienter standard in actions brought under
the antifraud provisions. 3 To date, five attempts to press this claim
have failed.''
The SEC opposed efforts to raise the bar for establishing scien-

ter.' 5 The thrust of the arguments raised in each of the cases challeng-

181. Id. at 194 n.12.
182. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Phillips
Petroleum See. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van Dyke v. Cobum Enters., Inc., 873
F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th
Cir. 1989); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 & n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds,
463 U.S. 646 (1983); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977).
Some commentators, however, have suggested that the apparent harmony among the circuits
may be misleading:
Notwithstanding the apparent consensus among the circuits, some tension seems
to exist between courts that suggest a showing of reckless conduct in and of itself is
sufficient to constitute scienter and those courts that appear to require a showing of
recklessness that is of such a nature that it can serve as evidence of actual knowledge or
intent.
Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, The Scienter Requirement Under Section 10(b), N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 16, 1995, at 5, 5.
Recently, a few district court cases held that the heightened pleading standards imposed by
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 require plaintiffs to create a strong inference
of knowing or intentional misconduct. See Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp.
205,208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746,757 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Powers v. Eichen, No. 96-1431-B, 1997 WL 587034, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 1997);
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 50 (D. Mass. 1997). The Silicon Graphicscourt,
however, held that a showing of "deliberate recklessness" (a previously unknown term) would
suffice. Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 757 ("Knowing or intentional misconduct includes
deliberate recklessness... 2). The Silicon Graphicscourt defined "deliberate recklessness" to mean
conduct which presents such a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that the defendant either knew
or must have been aware of it. See id.at 755. This strict definition of recklessness was first spelled
out by the Seventh Circuit in SundstrandCorp., 553 F.2d at 1045.
183. See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
184. See cases cited infra note 192.
185. In advocating a lower scienter standard, the SEC stated:
The Commission has consistently supported a recklessness standard for Section
10(b) liability in both Commission and private actions under the federal securities laws
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ing recklessness, with some variation, has been that the terms "manipulative" and "deceptive," found in section 10(b), have been held to connote
and that the word "reckless" is absent from the
knowing behavior,'886
7
statute.'
the
text of
For example, in Spear v. Ernst & Young,'88 the defendants argued
that "although most courts (but not the Fourth Circuit) have held that
recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the state-of-mind requirement for
section 10(b), the Supreme Court's recent decision in Central Bank of
Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., undercuts this
expansive approach to liability."'8 9 Analyzing the text of section 10(b),
Ernst argued that it is "difficult to imagine a person 'recklessly'
'devising' or 'contriving' to violate the law.""'
In squarely rejecting this argument, the court stated:
There is nothing in the text of Section 10(b) nor in the Supreme
Court's decision in CentralBank that says that recklessness is insufficient to fulfill the scienter requirement imposed by the courts on the
statute. The text of Section 10(b) actually contains no scienter requirement. Rather, this component of the cause of action has been added
over the years by courts interpreting the statute. Since the Section
contains no scienter requirement, a strict and literal reading of the
CentralBank case would result in scienter being actually immaterial to
the cause of action. 9'
Since Spear, CentralBank has repeatedly proved to be a dull knife

because such a standard is needed to protect investors and the securities markets from
fraudulent conduct and to protect the integrity of the disclosure process. A higher scienter
standard would lessen the incentives for corporations to conduct a full inquiry into
potentially troublesome or embarrassing areas, and thus would threaten the process that
has made our markets a model for nations around the world.
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Concerning Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 3, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. See. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 96-0393) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
186. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) ("The words 'manipulative or
deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane)). The Court reserved decision on whether recklessness
is sufficient for section 10(b) liability. See id at 194 n.12.
187. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
188. No. CIV.A.3:94-1150-17, 1994 WL 585815 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994).
189. Ernst & Young Motion to Dismiss, supra note 171, at 1 (citation omitted).
190. Id. at 13.
191. Spear, 1994 WL 585815, at *7 (citation omitted).
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inattempts to carve recklessness out of section 10(b). 92

192. The same argument was unsuccessfully made in four other cases:
1. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996). In holding that
recklessness remains sufficient, the court addressed the auditor's Central Bank argument, in a
footnote which pointedly began, "Central Bank ofDenver does not address the scienter requirement
for primary violations." Id. at 1233 n.22. The footnote concluded by noting that although Central
Bank quoted the portion ofErnst [which recites that "§ 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or
intentional misconduct," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)] this was of no
benefit to the auditor because Ernst explicitly did not answer whether "knowing or intentional"
conduct could include recklessness. See Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1233 n.22. Indeed, Ernst expressly
reserved the question. See Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 ("We need not address here the question
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule I0b-5.").
2. In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). A
defendant accounting firm, charged with recklessly conducting a series of audits, asserted that
"Central Bank's strict textual reading of Section 10(b) compels the conclusion that the scienter
element can no longer be established by a showing of mere recklessness." Id. at 988. In disposing
of this argument, the court stated that "CentralBank did not address the scienter requirement, and
the Second Circuit-in a decision post-dating CentralBank-has reaffirmed recklessness as a means
of establishing scienter." Id. at 989 (referring to Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp,Inc., 25 F.3d 1124,
1128-29 (2d Cir. 1994), which did not cite to CentralBank).
3. In re Phar-Mor, Inc. See. Litig., 892 F. Supp. 676 (V.D. Pa. 1995). This action was one
of many stemming from a financial fraud committed by Phar-Mor, a discount pharmaceutical chain.
See id at 680. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that had Coopers & Lybrand, Phar-Mor's
outside auditor, not recklessly and improperly performed certain audits of Phar-Mor, Coopers would
have uncovered the financial fraud and the plaintiffs would not have purchased their Phar-Mor
shares. See idat 682. Coopers was charged as a primary violator of section 10(b). See id. at 683.
Coopers argued, without regard to the prior Third Circuit standard, that Central Bank's
textualist approach now barred section 10(b) from reaching reckless conduct. See id. at 685. The
court summarized Coopers's argument as follows: "In short, defendant contends that had Congress
intended to make reckless conduct unlawful under section 10(b), it would have used the term
'reckless' in the statute.' Id. (footnote omitted). The court rejected this argument for two reasons.
First, it noted that the Southern District of New York had rejected this argument when presented in
Leslie Fay.See id. Second, the court cited to a post-CentralBank Third Circuit case, Kline v. First
Western Government Securities, Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994), which, in passing reference,
reaffirmed that the scienter requirement of section 10(b) may be satisfied by reckless conduct. PharMor, 892 F. Supp. at 685. Moreover, the Kline court was cognizant of CentralBank as it cited to
it, albeit on a different issue. Accordingly, the Phar-Morcourt held that reckless conduct satisfies
the scienter requirement of section 10(b). See id.
4. In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. See. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In its opinion,
the court sidestepped the issue of what is the necessary level of scienter to establish a section 10(b)
violation. Instead, the court referred to an earlier decision in this same case, in which the court had
held that the appropriate scienter standard is 'behavior which is either deliberate or so reckless that
an inference of fraudulent intent might be drawn by a reasonable finder of fact."' Id. at 692 (quoting
In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). The court concluded
that "plaintiffs' allegations of reckless conduct, which we previously held provide sufficient
circumstantial evidence of intent, satisfy even BDO's contention that CentralBankrequirespleading
actual intent," a at 693-94 (referring to a separate line of cases, beginning with Wechsler v.
Steinberg,733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984), and that "CentralBank does not affect the scienter standard
we adopted in Leslie Fay 1). The court thus declined BDO's invitation to use Central Bank to
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5. Remedies
Attempts have also been made to expand CentralBank's textualist
approach to limit remedies available to the SEC in enforcement
actions.'93 Simple logic dictates, however, that Central Bank has no
application here. CentralBank involved the question of whether there
was an implied right of action for aiding and abetting." But the federal
securities laws provide an express right of action for the SEC. 95
Moreover, the question of what remedies are available to redress a
proven violation is separate and distinct from the question of what
conduct is prohibited by the statute.
The Supreme Court indicated that federal courts have the power to
grant appropriate relief in an action explicitly authorized by statute. 96
It is settled that once a district court possesses subject matter jurisdiction,
"[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers
of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise
of that jurisdiction."'9 7 A growing body of case law adhered to this
rule, making clear that Central Bank does not limit the SEC's remedies. 9 These decisions illuminate the next limit of Central Bank- the
case does not in any way restrict a court's inherent equitable powers,
even though those powers are not codified.
The SEC's statutory authority to bring injunctive actions alleging
violations of the Exchange Act is set forth in Exchange Act section 21,
which expressly provides that whenever "any person is engaged or about
to engage" in a violation of the Exchange Act, the SEC may enjoin such
person and obtain money penalties and an officer and director bar.1
The statute does not expressly authorize the SEC to obtain disgorgement
and appointment of a receiver. Both of these remedies, however, are

eliminate recklessness as a basis for liability under section 10(b). See id.
193. See, e.g., SEC v. Febn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1283-88 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.denied, 66 U.S.L.W.
3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (No. 96-1883) (challenging the SEC's injunctive authority); SEC v.
O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1471-73 (D. Minn. 1995) (arguing that because disgorgement is not

an express remedy for a securities violation in section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, Central Bank
mandates that the SEC cannot order disgorgement of profits).

194. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1993).
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 11995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, u-1 (1994).
196. See Lane v. Pena, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2099 (1996) ("IIT]he federal courts have the power to
award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute."'

(quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992))).
197. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); accordFranldin,503 U.S. at 66.
198. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.

199. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1)-(3) (1994).
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firmly grounded in equity jurisprudence and have been mainstays in the
SEC's enforcement program. 2°° Nevertheless, in the wake of Central
Bank, new challenges have been asserted as to the availability of these
remedies, as well as to the authority to obtain injunctions based upon
past misconduct."' These challenges have failed." 2
Courts have continued to invoke their equitable powers to allow the
SEC to seek disgorgement. For example, in SEC v. Sands, the district
court held that CentralBank does not 'renounce[ the once predominant
view that courts may invoke whatever rights and remedies they deem
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the securities laws."' 3 Central
Bank "did not address the issue of remedies or overrule its prior
decisions that provide federal courts with the power to award appropriate
relief, including
disgorgement, when the defendant violates a federal
' ' °4
statute. 2

200. See, ag., SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ("The decision to
order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and the calculation of those gains, lie within the discretion
of the trial court ....); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In the exercise of its
equity powers, a district court may order the disgorgement of profits acquired through securities
fraud."); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the district court had
the power to issue a stay of all proceedings against the receivership); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs.,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Clearly the provision requiring the disgorging of proceeds
received in connection with the ... offering was a proper exercise of the district court's equity
powers.').
201. See, e.g., SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1472 (D. Minn. 1995) ("O'Hagan asserts
that CentralBank overruled the numerous decisions upholding disgorgement under the Exchange
Act. The Court, however, is unwilling to construe the rather narrow holding of Central Bank so
broadly as to drastically restrict the district court's long established equitable powers.").
202. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
203. 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (alteration in original).
204. Id. The issue was similarly disposed of in SEC v. FirstJersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d
1450 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (No. 96-1862). The
Southern District of New York found that defendant Robert E. Brennan ran First Jersey as a boiler
room, charging customers excessive markups and engaging in widespread market manipulation. See
id at 1459. The judgment required First Jersey and Brennan to disgorge approximately $75 million.
See id. at 1456. In his appeal to the Second Circuit, Brennan erroneously stated: "The decision in
CentralBank of Denver v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver is the most recent and graphic example
of the [Supreme] Court's restrictive approach toward implying remedies." Brief for DefendantAppellant Robert E. Brennan at 59, SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996) (No.
95-6192) (citation omitted) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). To the contrary, Central Bank
did not address remedies. Brennan argued to no avail that Exchange Act section 21(d) expressly
provides only for injunctive relief and not disgorgement and that, according to Central Bank the
latter may therefore not be awarded. See id. at 60. In its opinion, the Second Circuit easily disposed
of this argument, without even referencing Central Bank, by simply reiterating that "[o]nce the
district court has foimd federal securities law violations, it has broad equitable power to fashion
appropriate remedies, including ordering that culpable defendants disgorge their profits."FirstJersey,
101 F.3d at 1474. Brennan filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme
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In the only reported decision challenging the appointment of a

receiver, the court similarly held that CentralBank does not displace the
court's inherent equitable authority." 5 The court then proceeded to
appoint a receiver.20 6
Efforts to apply CentralBank to limit the availability of injunctive
relief under Exchange Act section 21 based upon past misconduct have
likewise been unsuccessful.2 7 Those who have argued that they may
not be enjoined because their misconduct took place in the past fail to

recognize that a past violation is not used as a substantive basis for an
injunction, but simply to gauge whether the defendant is likely to engage

in future violations.02 0 Accordingly, at least one court has agreed that

Court, wherein he repeated his Central Bank arguments. The Court, however, declined the
opportunity to address his argument when they denied his Petition. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc.,
66 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (No. 96-1862).
The argument was also raised in SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1471 (D. Minn.
1995). Echoing the sentiments of the other courts ruling on the issue, Senior Judge Renner of the
District of Minnesota, stated: "The Court... is unwilling to construe the rathernarrow holding of
Central Bank so broadly as to drastically restrict the district court's long established equitable
powers." Id. at 1472 (emphasis added). The appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit of the SEC's civil case was stayed pending O'Hagan's appeal from his insider trading
criminal conviction.
205. See SEC v. KS Resources, CV 95-8608-WDK (C.D. Cal. July 23, 1996). While no written
opinion was issued by the district court, the transcript of oral argument indicated that defense
counsel argued: "The CentralBank of Denver case says that in interpreting the securities laws, we
must look first of all to the statute itself. And if we look first of all to the statute itself, there is
clearly no right to a remedy of a receivership." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 25-26, SEC
v. KS Resources, CV 95-8608-WDK (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 1996). The Central District of California trial
judge did not find this argument convincing, stating during oral argument:
I believe that the CentralBank case stands for the proposition that there cannot be aiding
and abetting civil liability ....
However, in my view, a receivership is not a form of liability, but instead an
equitable remedy that this circuit and others have repeatedly confirmed that the respective
district courts possess.
Id. at 22-23. Judge Keller proceeded to order the appointment of a permanent receiver. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's interlocutory order appointing a permanent receiver. See SEC v.
KS Resources, 110 F.3d 69 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition).
206. See KS Resources, 110 F.3d at 69.
207. See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,66 U.S.L.W. 3249
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1997) (denying appellant's use of Central Bank to challenge the SEC's right to
injunctive relief and relying on the legislative history of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 to justify upholding the SEC's right to injunctive relief); O'Hagan,901 F. Supp. at 1472-73
(refusing to extend Central Bank to restrict remedies available under the Exchange Act).
208. See, e.g., SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1982)
(providing that evidence of past violations provides a basis for the inference that future violations
may occur); SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673, 682 (8th Cir. 1973) (providing that
improper conduct in the past raises an inference that such conduct will continue in the future); SEC
v. Interlink Data Network, Inc., No. CIV.A.93-3073-R, 1993 WL 603274, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
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it is of no consequence that section 21 only authorizes the Commission
to obtain injunctive relief where the defendant "is engaged or about to
engage" in a violation, but not where the defendant "has engaged" in
such a violation.2"
6. Agency Principles of Liability
Section 10(b) liability has on occasion been imposed based on the
2 10
agency principles of apparent authority and respondeat superior.
Apparent authority holds an employer liable when he puts an employee
or other agent in a position which enables the agent, while apparently
acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon third persons.21'
Respondeat superior subjects an employer to liability for the violations
that his employee committed while acting in the scope of employ21 2
ment.

In the wake of CentralBank, these theories have been challenged,
yielding mixed results. 3 In the seven cases addressing the issue to
15, 1993) (providing criteria upon which to gauge the likelihood of future violations).
209. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. at 1473. "[IThe text of § 21(d) expressly authorizes a temporary
or permanent injunction. O'Hagan disputes not the textual authority to seek an injunction, but rather
the evidence which the Court may consider to determine a defendant's propensity to engage in future
violations. CentralBank has no application to that issue." Id.
The same argument was made in a motion to dismiss by a defendant in SEC v. Beagelman,
No. 96 CV 3899 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1996). See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Elliot
Stumacher's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 12-14, SEC v. Beagelman, No. 96 CV 3899
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). As of this writing, the motion is
pending.
210. The Commission has rarely relied on these theories of liability. See SEC v. Geon Indus.,
531 F.2d 39, 55 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 813 (2d Cir.
1975). Agency principles have more often been relied upon by private plaintiffs. See Nordstrom, Inc.
v. Chubb & Son, Inc. 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995); Harrison v. Dean Witter, 974 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1992); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane);
Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 784 F.2d 29,30 (1st Cir. 1986); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir.
1981); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-16 (2d Cir. 1980); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Hyannis Harborview, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 676 (D.
Mass. 1993); In re Network Equip. Tech., Inc. Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Xaphes
v. Merrill Lynch, 600 F. Supp. 692 (D. Me. 1985).
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 (1957).
212. See id. § 219.
213. Justice Stevens asserted in his CentralBank dissent that "in § 10(b) actions... respondeat
superiorand other common-law agency principles.... appear unlikely to survive the Court's decision." Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 200 n.12 (1994) (citation omitted). Others
concurred with Justice Stevens's observation. See, e.g., Central Bank Hearing,supranote 60, at 130
('The Central Bank decision presages the potential demise of respondeatsuperior and other forms
of non-statutory vicarious liability... under the Federal securities laws." (letter from Harvey L. Pitt,
Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson to Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Securities
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date, plaintiffs have prevailed three times and defendants have prevailed
on four occasions.214 In three of the four cases in which defendants
prevailed, however, the courts conducted virtually no analysis of the
issue and simply assumed their holdings were required by Central
Bank. 5 In the fourth case, the court's reasoning does not appear
persuasive. 22116 Considering the mixed record on this issue, a final
limitation of Central Bank is apparent--the case does not stand, as
dissenting Justice Stevens feared, for the broader proposition that all
forms of secondary liability, other than controlling person liability under
section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, are without basis.
The conclusion that all secondary liability has not been eliminated
by CentralBank is underscored by the decision in AT&T v. 41nback &
Conserve Program, Inc.217 In Winback, AT&T sued a competitor and
its president, alleging acts of unfair competition in violation of, inter alia,
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, based upon the actions of the
competitor's sales representatives. 8 AT&T relied on common law
theories of agency, including the doctrine of apparent authority.2 9 The
district court denied AT&T's application for a preliminary injunction,
holding that the sales representatives resembled independent contractors
more than agents 2 0
On appeal, the defendants for the first time raised the argument that,
in light of Central Bank, common law doctrines of secondary liability

Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs)); id.at 152 (letter
from Professor Joel Seligman, University of Michigan Law School to Sen. Donald Riegle, Jr.,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (noting that respondeat
superior is unlikely to survive after the CentralBank decision)).
214. See AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1430-33 (3d Cir.
1994) (providing that defendant could be held liable for the acts of his agents under the Lanham
Act); Seolas v. Bilzerian, 951 F. Supp. 978, 984 (D. Utah 1997) (concluding that respondeat superior
theory of liability furthers the intent of securities laws); Seidel v. Lee, 954 F. Supp. 810, 819 (D.
Del. 1996) (finding no vicarious liability of general partners for violations by limited partners); In
re Prudential Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.95-4704, 1996 WL 392145, at *26 (D.N.J. May 10, 1996)
(dismissing plaintiffs' claim on the theory of respondeat superior); ESI Montgomery County, Inc.
v. Montenay Int'l Corp., No. 94-0119, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 592, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996)
(declining to find defendant secondarily liable for alleged fraudulent acts of its officers).
215. See Seidel, 954 F. Supp. at 819; Prudential,1996 WL 392145, at *26; ESI Montgomery,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 592, at *7-8.
216. See infra notes 227-36 and accompanying text.
217. 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994).
218. See id. at 1423-24.
219. See id. at 1428-29.
220. See id. at 1426.
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may not be imported into the Lanham Act.2" The court held that
"Central Bank's discussion of aiding and abetting should not be
transplanted into the more settled realm of agency law."' t The court
reasoned as follows:
[A]iding and abetting liability, with its focus on the defendant's
substantial and knowing assistance to the commission of a tort, rests by
definition upon acts that encourage a tort rather than acts constituting
the tort. By definition then, the act rendered unlawful under an aiding
and abetting theory is different than the act rendered unlawful by the
underlying tort.
By contrast, courts imposing liability on agency theories are not
expanding the category of airmative conduct proscribed by the
relevant statute; rather, they are deciding on whose shoulders to place
responsibility for conduct indisputably proscribed by the relevant
statute. The principal is held liable not because it committed some
wrongdoing outside the purview of the statute which assisted the
wrongdoing prohibited by the statute, but because its status merits
responsibility for the tortious actions of its agent. m
While Winback involved alleged violations of the Lanham Act, the
court's reasoning seems equally applicable in the federal securities law
context. Indeed, when faced with the issue in a securities context, the
District of Utah, in Seolas v. Bilzerian,2 4 relied on Winback and
rejected defendants' argument that "because the text of § 10(b) does not
specifically mention agency or respondeat superior, the reasoning of
Central Bank makes these theories of liability unavailable."'

221. See id, at 1429. The Third Circuit addressed the argument after finding that plaintiffs had
failed to assert that defendants waived it by not raising it in the lower court. See id. at 1429 n.10.
222. Id. at 1432.
223. Id. at 1430-31 (citation omitted).
224. 951 F. Supp. 978 (D. Utah 1997).
225. Id. at 983. Similarly, in Pollackv. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., Civ. No. 90-5788, 1995 WL
261518 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995), the Southern District of New York refused to preempt agency
liability claims on the basis of CentralBank. Judge Cote, while noting that CentralBank has "called
into question all common law claims that are adjunct to a direct securities claim," id. at *17, allowed
the claims to proceed because "[u]nlike aiding and abetting... liability of a principal based upon
apparent authority has long been recognized by federal courts," id at *17; see also Tranchina v.
Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-2886, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12361, at
*5 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1997) (rejecting CentralBank challenge to respondeat superior).
At least two other courts have allowed section 10(b) agency theories of liability to go
forward post-CentralBank.See Denten v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 887 F. Supp.
176 (N.D. Ill. 1995); In re Stat-Tech Sec. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Colo. 1995). While it
appears that in these cases no challenge was made to the validity of these theories, the courts were

still very much aware of Central Bank as they cited to it on other issues.
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Three of the courts that have rejected agency claims engaged in
little or no analysis of whether such claims are barred by CentralBank;,
they have simply assumed that CentralBank forecloses the inquiry. For
example, in ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay International

Corp., Judge Carter of the Southern District of New York stated:
[I]n view of CentralBank of Denver,N.A. v. FirstInterstate Bank of
Denver,N.A, where the Supreme Court recently found that one form of
secondary liability--aiding and abetting-was no longer applicable to
claims brought under the securities laws .... the court finds that
MERMCI is not liable for violations of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 arising
from the alleged misrepresentations made by the officers of MERMCI
based on the principle of respondeat superior'

The court offered no additional explanation for its holding.
The court in the remaining case, In re Fidelity/Micron Securities
Litigation, 7 analyzed the issue in greater detail. Plaintiffs sought to
invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold a mutual fund liable

for alleged misrepresentations by its portfolio manager that he favored a
certain stock, when he was actually divesting the fund of the stock.
Rejecting this argument, the court stated that to hold otherwise would

allow liability without any showing of reliance on a misstatement or
omission by the defendant.'

The court elaborated that it was not

conferring immunity on corporate entities which by nature can only
speak through their agents:

226. No. 94-0119, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 592, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996) (footnote
omitted). Prudential Insurance also prevailed on this issue in In re PrudentialInsurance Co. Sales
PracticesLitigation,No. 1061, CIV.A.95-4704, 1996 WL 392145 (D.NJ. May 10, 1996). With only
a single cite to ESI Montgomery, the court dismissed plaintiffs' securities law claims against
Prudential based upon respondeat superior. See id, at *26. It appears that the court found little need
to expend energy analyzing the issue because, even prior to CentralBank, respondeat superior was
unavailable in the Third Circuit in securities cases. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880,
884-85 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that respondeat superior is inconsistent with the Third Circuit's
"culpable participant" approach to section 20(a) controlling person liability).
Rounding out this string of cases is Seidel v. Lee, 954 F. Supp. 810 (D. Del. 1996). Here,
the District of Delaware refused to hold two defendants vicariously liable for their employees'
violations of the Investment Company Act. See id. at 819-20. The court found persuasive that the
plain language of the section charged contains a "willful" requirement which the secondary
defendants did not satisfy. See idt at 820. The court's analysis overlooks that the defendants were
not being charged as primary violators, but rather were being charged based on their vicarious
responsibility for the acts of their agents. Under the court's analysis, a corporate employer would
not be liable for damage caused in an automobile accident by its employee because the employer
itself was not negligent. This conclusion is certainly erroneous.
227. 964 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1997).
228. See id. at 544.
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The difference between primary corporate liability, which survives
CentralBank, and secondary liability, which does not, lies in the fact
that in primary liability the corporate delegate has spoken as the
corporation.By contrast, in the realm of vicarious liability, a corporate
delegate has simply spoken in the scope of his employment or agency
and the corporation is strictly liable by reason of that relationship to the
delegate. 9
This approach is flawed for several reasons. First, it conflicts with
the Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area. In American Society
of MechanicalEngineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,uo the Court stated
that "the apparent authority theory has long been the settled rule in the
federal system.... [and] 'few doctrines of the law are more firmly
established or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy
than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own.""
The Court expressly cited with approval Holloway v. Howerddn
which invoked agency principles in a case involving violations of the
federal securities laws. 3
Second, the Court's central inquiry in Hydrolevel, an antitrust case,
focused on whether liability under an apparent authority theory was
consistent with the intent behind the Sherman Act. 4 Agency principles
of liability are clearly consistent with the intent behind the federal
securities laws. "[Imposing such liability will encourage corporate
officials to prevent unauthorized... misrepresentations, thereby helping
to achieve an important Securities Act purpose. ' Finally, the dividing
line drawn by the court in Fidelity seems artificial. Exchange Act section
3(9) defines person to include any "company." Clearly, the drafters
contemplated some form of vicarious liability would apply as companies
can only act through their agents. Nothing found in the text of the
securities laws supports limiting a company's liability along the lines of
the test set out in Fidelity.

229. Id. at 544 n.10.
230. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).

231. Id. at 567-68 (quoting Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356 (1929)).
232. 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).

233. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 568.
234. See id. at 570.
235. In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. See. Litig., 784 F.2d 29, 32 (Ist Cir. 1986) (Breyer,
J.).
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C.

Reaction by the PlaintiffBar

CentralBank has caused plaintiffs to reexamine section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 in an effort to identify alternative theories of liability for
those traditionally charged as aiders and abettors. With the loss of aiding
and abetting, private plaintiffs have most often alleged that secondary
actors should be held liable as primary violators on one or more of the
following grounds: (1) participation in a conspiracy to violate section
10(b), (2) issuance of a material misstatement or omission, and (3)
participation in a "scheme to defraud" under Rule lOb-5.
1. Conspiracy Liability
In his CentralBank dissent, Justice Stevens predicted: "The Court's
rationale would sweep away the decisions recognizing that a defendant
may be found liable in a private action for conspiring to violate § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5."2 6 To date, Justice Stevens's prediction has proven
accurate, but the issue is very much alive.
Since Central Bank, at least twenty-eight decisions have held that
conspiracy to violate section 10(b) is no longer a viable theor '

236. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 200 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
237. See SIPC v. Holmes, No. 94-56468, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1963 (9th Cir.Jan. 23, 1996);
In re GlenFed, Inc. See. Litig., 60 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1995); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 54 F.3d 1422
(9th Cir. 1995); Sunrise Fin., Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Utah 1996); Klein
v. Boyd, No. 95-5410, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17153 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1996); Snap-On Inc. v.
Ortiz, No. 96-C2138, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16045 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1996); Vennittilli v.
Primerica, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Weinstein v. Jain,No. C-94-1015-EFL, 1995
WL 787549 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995); Kidder Peabody & Co. v. Unigestion Int'l, Ltd., 903 F. Supp.
479 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re College Bound Consol.
Litig., Nos. 93 CIV. 2348, 94 CIV. 3033, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10684 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995);
Pitten v. Jacobs, 903 F. Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1995); Van de Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F.
Supp. 731 (D. Mass. 1995); In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal.
1995); McGann v. Ernst & Young, No. SA CV 93-814 AHS, 1995 WL 852119 (C.D. Cal. May 30,
1995), rev'd, 102 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Alliance Pharm. Sec. Litig., Nos. 92-1380-IEG,
92-1445, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11351 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 1995); Stamatio v. Hurco Cos., 885 F.
Supp. 1180 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Upton v. McKerrow, 887 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Otto v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 82-C4762, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3352 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16,
1995); In re Faleck & Margolies, Ltd., Nos. 89 Civ. 8548, 90 Civ. 1356, 1995 WL 33631 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 1995); In re Medlmmune, Inc. See. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1995); Burnstein v.
Graves, No. C 92-3623 FMS, 1994 WL 792541 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1994); In re Gupta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Rasterops Corp. See. Litig., No. C-93-20349 RPA,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18245 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994); Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 906 F.
Supp. 1470 (D. Utah 1994), affd, 69 F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1995); In re Ross Sys. See. Litig., No.
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These courts based their decisions on a variety of rationales. Some have

held that because the text of section 10(b) does not mention "conspiracy," there is no conspiracy liability. 8 At least four opinions have cited
to Justice Stevens's Central Bank dissent as support for their dismissal
of these claims. 9 Other courts, pointing to the provisions of the securi-

ties laws which impose liability on those who "control" the primary
violator, have concluded that Congress knew how to impose secondary
liability expressly when it desired to do so.24 ° Still others have ex-

pressed the concern that every aiding and abetting claim can be recast as
a conspiracy, thus rendering CentralBank meaningless.24'
The SEC asserted claims for conspiracy liability in an enforcement
action brought after Central Bank. In SEC v. U.S. Environmental, the

SEC sued multiple defendants charging, inter alia, that six of the
defendants conspired to violate several provisions of the securities laws,
including section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5.242 In so
doing, the SEC relied on two Supreme Court precedents, MerrillLynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran 3 and Herman & MacLean v.

Huddleston.2 4 In Curran,the Supreme Court endorsed a civil conspira-

cy claim under a Commodity Exchange Act rule analogous to Rule

C-94-0017-DLU, 1994 WL 583114 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 1994); In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855
F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd, 95 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996).
238. See, e.g., GlenFed, 60 F.3d at 592 ('The Court's rationale [in Central Bank] precludes a
private right of action for 'conspiracy' liability."); Gupta Corp., 900 F. Supp. at 1244 ("The text of
Section 10(b) does not refer to any form of conspiracy liability. Under Central Bank, therefore,
plaintiffs may not maintain a private action for conspiracy to violate Section 10(b).'); Syntex Corp.,
855 F. Supp. at 1098 ('The Court's rationale in Central Bank of Denver... forecloses Plaintiffs'
conspiracy liability theory. Section 10(b) is silent as to conspiracy liability .. .).
239. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl., 897 F. Supp. at 119 ("The Court's rationale would sweep away the
decisions recognizing that a defendant may be found liable in a private action for conspiringto
violate § 10(b) and Rule lOb-S."' (quoting Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 201
n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Upton, 887 F. Supp. at 1580 (same); Pitten, 903 F. Supp. at
950 ('Thus, CentralBank 'forecloses... conspiracy liability theory.' Indeed, the dissenting opinion
...recognized this implication of the Court's opinion." (citations omitted) (citing CentralBank,511
U.S. at n.12) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Ross Sys., 1994 WL 583114, at *3 ("[iTbe assessment of the
majority holding [in CentralBank]by dissenting Justice Stevens that the Supreme Court has 'swe(pt)
away' a cause of action for conspiracy under § 10(b) ... Oin the merits Justice Stevens has it
right." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
240. See CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 184 ("[When Congress wished to create such [secondary]
liability, it had little trouble doing so." (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988))).
241. See, e.g., Pitten, 903 F. Supp. at 950 (giving an example of an attempt to recast an aiding
and abetting claim as a conspiracy).
242. See U.S. Envtil., 897 F. Supp. at 118.
243. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
244. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
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10b-5. 245 In Huddleston, the Court cited Curran in a footnote in a

manner supporting the belief that while it never passed on lOb-5 aiding
and abetting liability, it approved of conspiracy liability.2'
The SEC based the conspiracy charge on allegations that the
defendants agreed to manipulate the price of U.S. Environmental shares
by dominating and controlling its trading in the aftermarket.247 The
district court, granting a motion to dismiss, held:
The Commission is authorized to bring an enforcement action, only in
the event of an imminent or actual "violation" of the Securities Acts,
and the Commission has failed to identify any statutorytext that makes
it a... violation of the Securities Acts... to conspire to violate any
one or all of the [federal securities laws]. Under the reasoning of
CentralBank, the Commission's failure in this regard is dispositive.2"
Because Curran was decided prior to Central Bank, the court was not
persuaded that it required a different result.249
Notwithstanding the weight of contrary precedent, at least one court
has been unwilling to scrap conspiracy liability. In In re Towers
Financial Corp. Noteholders Litigation, Judge Whitman Knapp of the
Southern District of New York held that CentralBank does not preclude
the possibility of Rule lOb-5 conspiracy liability.s ° Judge Knapp began
by stating that he was not persuaded by the decisions from other courts
on this issue." He then noted that it was clear that the aiding and
abetting allegations in CentralBank were based on reckless conduct."s
Judge Knapp observed that "[t]his does not seem to us the action of a
Court that considered itself to be eliminating the possibility of Rule
lOb-5 conspiracy liability for intentional wrongdoers." ' "ssJudge Knapp
rejected the argument that recognizing conspiracy liability would render
245. See Curran,456 U.S. at 389 n.88.
246. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 379 n.5.
247. See U.S. Envtl., 897 F. Supp. at 118.
248. Id. at 119 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).

249. See id.
at 120.
250. Seeln reTowers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., 936 F. Supp. 126, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
251. See id. at 129.

252. See id. at 130.
253. Id. For a discussion questioning Judge Knapp's decision, see Edward Brodsky, The
Conspiracy Question Revisited: The Scope of § 10(b), N.Y. LJ., Sept. 11, 1996, at 3.
The question is whether that distinction, based upon the standard of scienter,
should make a difference in result, and arguably it should not. The reasoning of Central
Bank seems to apply to all aiding and abetting claims-whether recklessness or
willfulness is alleged-and, it would appear, should also apply to conspiracy claims.
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CentralBank meaningless since aiding and abetting claims can easily be
repleaded as conspiracy claims.' Rather, he noted that not all aiding
and abetting claims are so easily transformed because aiding and abetting

liability can be based on reckless conduct, whereas conspiracy liability
m "
requires knowing and willful participation.

2. Recasting Actions by Secondary Defendants as Primary
Violations
Prior to Central Bank, the distinction between primary and
secondary violations was largely academic. Secondary actors, such as
accountants, lawyers, and underwriters, were routinely charged as aiders
and abettors and, if found liable, were subject to liability joint and
several with primary violators. With the elimination of private actions for
aiding and abetting, plaintiffs have begun to explore various theories of
primary liability in efforts to reach these secondary actors. 6 In
particular, plaintiffs have brought claims against these persons under two
subsections of Rule lOb-5 that have not traditionally been used to charge
secondary actors. 7

254. See Towers, 936 F. Supp. at 130.
255. See 1i. After the plaintiffs in Towers amended their complaint to include the conspiracy
charges, the defendant, the law finn of Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, moved to
dismiss. See Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 945 F. Supp. 84, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Judge Knapp denied the motion but did certify the question for interlocutory appeal
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. at 87. In denying the motion, Judge Knapp referred
to the transcript of oral argument before the Supreme Court in CentralBank and was influenced by
questions apparently asked by Justices Kennedy and Scalia, both in the Central Bank majority,
suggesting that conspiracy to violate section 10(b) remains a viable claim. See id. at 85-86.
Specifically, both justices asked counsel for defendant-petitioner why the case against Central Bank
could not simply be refrained as conspiracy, to which counsel essentially responded that the theory
had not been presented in the case. See id While not noted by Judge Knapp, a review of the Central
Bank oral argument transcript discloses that a third Justice stated:
The question, as Justice Scalia raised, is whether it really falls within sort of the
rounding-out jurisprudence, and I mean, Justice Kennedy's point is that they could have
been pursued on a conspiracy theory, and at least on traditional tort principles that would
not have been regarded as a departure.
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 6, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S.
164 (1994) (No. 92-854). As of this writing, the appeal is pending before the Second Circuit.
256. See, e.g., In re Blech See. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (alleging that a
clearing agent had actual knowledge of broker's fraudulent conduct as well as motive to engage in
deception with broker).
257. See cases cited infra note 261.
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a. Material Misrepresentations or Omissions
In a number of cases post-CentralBank, plaintiffs have charged that
secondary actors have made misstatements or omissions in violation of
Rule lOb-5(b)"5 under circumstances in which the statements or
omissions are in fact the joint product of multiple persons. An example
of such a case is the preparation of a corporation's prospectus with either
drafting assistance from, or review by, accountants, lawyers, underwriters, and other professionals. In other cases, plaintiffs have alleged that
secondary actors are liable for misstatements or omissions in documents
they have not prepared, but which contain alleged misstatements they
have made." An example of this type of case is where an attorney or
accountant's opinion is included in a corporation's offering documents
which are alleged to be fraudulent. Significant questions have arisen as
to what it means to "make" a misstatement or omission.
In such cases, secondary defendants--most often accountants and

underwriters-routinely make motions either to dismiss for failure to
state a claim or for summary judgment on these charges, arguing that at
most they aided and abetted and such charges cannot be sustained postCentral Bank.26 Defendants, however, have had only limited success
with these arguments. In an examination of twenty-five rulings on
motions in which the defendant argued that secondary violations were
being improperly couched as primary violations,2 6' we found only four

258. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1997) (making it unlawful to "make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact... in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security).
259. See Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd,
108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997).
260. See id.
at 316.
261. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996) (accountant); In re
Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig, 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994) (accountant); In re Blech Sec.
Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (broker-dealer); Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp.,
1997 WL 269488 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997) (underwriter); In re Cirrus Logic Sec. Litig., 946 F. Supp.
1446 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (officers and directors); Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, No. 95-8905,
1996 WL 494904, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1996) (broker-dealer); Picard Chem. Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
940 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (underwriter); In re Lake State Commodities, Inc., 936 F.
Supp. 1461 (N.D. Il.1996) (commodities broker); Phillips, 933 F. Supp. at 303 (underwriter); SEC
v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (broker-dealer); In re JWP Inc. See. Litig.,
928 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (audit committee members); Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., No. CIV.95-1926-MA, 1996 WL 393662 (D. Or. May 9, 1996) (underwriter); In re
ICN/Viratek See. Litig., No. 87 CIV.4296, 1996 WL 164732 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (officers and
directors); In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (officers,
underwriter, and accountant), vacatedin part,No. CV 93 876, 1996 WL 158319 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
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in which defendants succeeded in getting the charges dismissed.262 In
an additional four, defendants were successful in getting some of the

allegations dismissed, with the case proceeding on the remaining
allegations.263 In the other seventeen cases, the motions were denied.
Three circuit courts have ruled on the dividing line between primary

and secondary liability, each drawing the line quite differently.2' 4 The
broadest formulation came from the Second Circuit in SEC v. First

Jersey Securities,Inc.2 " The court held that "[p]rimary liability may be
imposed 'not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations
but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its
preparation. m' ' A later Second Circuit case, however, appears to be at
odds with First Jersey. In Shapiro v. Cantor,the Second Circuit panel

stated: "Allegations of 'assisting,' 'participating in,' 'complicity in' and
similar synonyms used throughout the complaint all fall within the
prohibitive bar of Central Bank."267 The court held that section 10(b)
requires the defendant to have personally made a material misrepresenta-

tion or omission.211
In Software Toolworks, the Ninth Circuit ruled that primary liability

could attach to an accounting firm that played a "significant role" in
1996) (reconsideration of underwriter motion to dismiss from MTCJ); In re Cascade Int'l See. Litig.,
894 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (accountant); O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Mich.
1995) (accountant); Seeman v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 896 F. Supp. 250 (D. Conn. 1995)
(accountant); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (accountant); Adam
v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (accountants); Employers Ins. v.
Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (attorneys and accountant), amended
by 948 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Cal. 1995); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp.
26 (D. Mass. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best See. Litig., No. CV-87-3574-RSWL, 1994 WVL 746649 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) (underwriter); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (accountant); In re ZZZZ Best See. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (accountant).
These twenty-five decisions represent most, but not all, reported decisions on this issue.
262. See Primavera,1996 WL 494904, at *21; Lake State Commodities, 936 F. Supp. at 1479;
US. Envtl., 929 F. Supp. at 122; Cascade,894 F. Supp. at 444.
263. See Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 629-30; Kendall Square,868 F. Supp. at 28-29; MTC,
898 F. Supp. at 989; Vosgerichian, 862 F. Supp. at 1378.
264. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 66
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1862) (holding that knowledge of the fraud and
assistance in the preparation of the fraudulent documents constitutes primary liability); Anixter, 77
F.3d at 1226 (holding that defendants must actually make an alleged misleading statement or
omission to be primarily liable); Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 628 (holding that primary liability
may be imposed only on those who had a "significant role" in the preparation of the misleading
materials, even though they were not the author of the statement).
265. 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
266. Id. at 1471 (quoting Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994)).
267. No. 96-9529, 1997 WL 547939, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 1997).
268. See id.
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drafting and editing misleading offering materials, even though the firm
itself was not the maker of the statement.269 The court did not, however, specify which prong of Rule lOb-5 the accounting firm may have

violated.
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit, in Anixter, created a bright-line test
and ruled, similar to the Second Circuit in Shapiro, that regardless of
which prong of Rule 10b-5 is alleged to have been violated, the terms of
section 10(b) still require the defendant to have made an alleged
7 0 The court specified that the
misleading statement or omission."
amount of assistance rendered is irrelevant if no misstatement or
omission is made by the secondary actor himself.271 The district courts
appear equally split.272

269. See Software Toolwork, 50 F.3d at 628 n.3.
270. See Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226.
271. See id. at 1226 n.10.
272. Cases following Software Toolworks: Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303,
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (underwriter may be primarily liable for participating in formulating the
language of a misleading prospectus); Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., No.
CIV.95-1926-MA, 1996 WL 393662, at *6 (D. Or. May 9, 1996) (coordinating the offering, drafting
the disputed documents, and conducting due diligence suffices to hold an underwriter primarily
liable); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 432 (N.D. IIl. 1995) (primary liability
may attach where accountant played a "central role" in preparing the offering materials); Adam v.
Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (accountants can be primarily
liable for allowing issuer to release misleading financial statements); Employers Ins. v. Musick,
Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 389-90 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (accountants who were "architects of
the prospectus" can be primary violators); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., No. CV-87-3574-RSWL,
1994 WL 746649, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) (underwriters who did not draft misleading
prospectus may still be primarily liable because their names appeared thereon); In re 77Z7 Best See.
Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (accountants may be primarily liable for reviewing,
editing, and approving misleading documents).
Cases following Anixter Picard Chem. Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1120 (V.D.
Mich. 1996) (disapproving of the "substantial participation" test); In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F.
Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); In reMTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp.
974, 985-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that "if Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a
defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section
10(b)"), vacatedin part,No. CV 93 876, 1996 VL 158319 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1996); In re Cascade
Int'l See. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (provision of advice by accounting firm
insufficient for primary liability); O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Mich. 1995)
(primary liability may attach to accountants only for either drafting the misleading documents or
issuing a knowingly false audit opinion); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F.
Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (accountants not liable for reviewing and approving offering
materials); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (accountants
not liable for advising issuer and concurring in certain accounting treatments).
Case following First Jersey Securities: In re Health Management, Inc. See. Litig., No.
96-889, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10665, at *48 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1997) ("[P]laintiffs need not allege
that [certain corporate officers] made any fraudulent statements during the Class period," as long as
the officers had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration.).
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A clearer picture of whether participation in drafting offering
documents, without more, suffices for primarily liability will emerge as

more circuit courts rule on the issue. The firmest conclusion in this area
to date is that an accountant or attorney opinion letter issued in
conjunction with an offering will be considered the making of a
statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, sufficient
to attach primary liability."
b. Scheme to Defraud

When it is clear that no misstatement or omission has been made,
plaintiffs fall back on the "scheme to defraud" language of Rule
lOb-5(1) 4 Section 10(b) authorizes the Commission to adopt rules to
forbid the direct or indirect use or employment of any "deceptive device
or contrivance," language that appears broad enough to justify the
scheme prong of Rule lOb-5.275 There have been nine reported opinions
ruling on whether Central Bank precludes allegations that a defendant
engaged in a "scheme to defraud.""
Opining that these are essentially artfully pleaded conspiracy claims,
four of the eight courts have held that such claims are now precluded.277 In a fifth case, In re Gupta Securities Litigation,7 the plaintiffs
argued that the text "scheme ...to defraud" creates an implied private
273. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (upholding primary antifraud
violation against an accounting firm which had issued an opinion concerning the issuer's financial
statements); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996); Anixter, 77 F.3d at
1227; Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 1994); MTC, 898 F. Supp. at
988; Bank v. Ernst & Young, No. 89-6015-CIV., 1995 WL 852118, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 1995);
In re Phar-Mor, Inc. See. Litig., 892 F. Supp. 676, 682 (W.D. Pa. 1995); ONeil,897 F. Supp. at
1000; Adam, 884 F. Supp. at 1399; In re Leslie Fay Cos., 871 F. Supp. 686, 688, 695 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 27, 29; Vosgerichian, 862 F. Supp. at 1378; Spear v. Ernst
& Young, No. CIV.A.3:94-1150-17, 1994 WL 585815, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994).
274. See 17 C.F.L § 240.10b-5(a) (1997) (making it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defaud... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security").
275. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
276. See Cooper v. Pickett, 122 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997); In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., No. C95-20459 JW, 1996 WL 37788
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996); Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. 95-20017 RPA, 1995 WL 743728
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1995); SEC v, U.S. Envtl., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re U.S.A.
Classic See. Litig., No. 93-6667, 1995 WL 363841 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995); Stack v. Lobo, No.
95-20049 SW, 1995 WL 241448 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1995); Robbins v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No.
94-1655-J, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17870 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1995); In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig.,
900 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
277. See Valence Tech., 1996 WL 37788, at *10-11; Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at *11; U.S.
Envd., 897 F. Supp. at 119-20; Stack, 1995 WL 241448, at *10.
278. 900 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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right of action for conspiracy. 9 The court dismissed the claim because
"[a] scheme need not refer to a conspiracy .... One person can scheme
alone to break all manner of laws, including federal securities laws."'ro
This decision is somewhat puzzling because it does not explain how a
single person can be liable for a "scheme to defraud," but multiple
persons engaged together in a scheme cannot. The remaining four cases,
however, have held that CentralBank does not sound the death knell for
"scheme to defraud" charges."
CONCLUSION

Over the years, court decisions interpreting the federal securities
laws have covered a wide spectrum, with broad and expansive interpretations at one end and narrow and restrictive holdings at the other. The
pendulum has frequently shifted, often in response to pronouncements by
the Supreme Court. CentralBank was viewed by many as the beginning
of another pendulum swing toward a narrow, literal interpretation of the
securities laws. A creative defense bar was quick to urge courts to follow
the strict textualist methodology employed by the Supreme Court in
CentralBank in efforts to whittle away other well-established securities
law principles. For the most part, the defense bar's arguments have been
rejected. If anything, Central Bank has proven to mark both the

279. Id. at 1244.
280. Id.
281. See Cooper v. Pickett, No. 95-55657, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21034, at *10 (9th Cir. Aug.
8, 1997) ("CentralBank does not preclude liability based on allegations that a group of defendants
acted together to violate the securities laws, as long as each defendant committed a manipulative or
deceptive act in furtherance of a scheme:); Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 762. "Plaintiff's
scheme allegations appear to be 'no more than a thinly disguised attempt to avoid the impact of the
Central Bank decision."' Id. The court, however, refused to dismiss the charges. Rather, the court
set the ground rules for what plaintiffs will be required to prove, stating that "[a]lthough plaintiffs
need not allege that every defendant participated in every aspect of a fraudulent scheme to state a
claim, section 10 liability requires a finding that each individual took some action in furtherance of
the scheme:' Id.;see USA. Classic,1995 WL 363841, at *5 ("[P]laintiffs correctly note that Central
Bank does not limit the liability of those who participate in a scheme to defraud, for Central Bank
had not committed a manipulative or deceptive act."); Hometown Buffet, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17870, at *18 ("[T]he court recognizes that in some situations a plaintiff might successfully allege
a scheme to defraud under section 10(b) when there are specific allegations that several plaintiffs
participated in producing misrepresentations....").
In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court provided some indication that it would allow "scheme to
defraud" charges. The Court clarified that its statement in CentralBank that secondary actors may
be chargeable as primary violators for making a material misstatement or omission was merely meant
as one example of conduct which would suffice, with the implication that scheme charges would also
be sufficient. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2213 (1997).
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beginning and the end of any pendulum swing toward a more restrictive
interpretation of the securities laws. This conclusion is underscored by
the Court's recent opinion in O'Hagan,which tempers its textual analysis
by paying homage to the animating purposes of the securities laws,
namely, safeguarding the integrity of the securities markets and
protecting investors.
In addition to O'Hagan, other decisions by lower courts after
CentralBank establish important limits on the scope of the case. In sum,
the limits are as follows: First, CentralBank's textualist approach does
not equate to literalism. 2 Section 10(b)'s broad terms continue to
capture conduct not literally proscribed by the statute. Second, Central
Bank arguably does not extend beyond section 10(b). 83 Third,
textualism does not control when there is any degree of ambiguity in the
statute.' Fourth, textualism does not abrogate the court's inherent
equitable powers." s Finally, Central Bank does not stand for the
broader proposition that all forms of secondary liability, other than those
provided for by statute, are eradicated.286
So what has been the fallout from CentralBank? In short, with the
exception of the virtual elimination of conspiracy liability, CentralBank
has been limited to its holding. Its strict textualist approach is not being
widely and blindly followed by lower courts. The proscriptions of the
federal securities laws have remained flexible, and courts have retained
broad powers to fashion remedies.
We believe that this approach is the proper one. The Supreme Court
made it clear in CentralBank that it has not uniformly applied a strict
textualist approach to interpreting the federal securities laws. Rather, it
stated that it has resorted to such an approach in determining the scope
of conduct prohibitedby section 10(b), when the text is unambiguous in
the context presented. The Court's decision provides no mandate that this
approach applies when interpreting any other aspect of the federal
securities laws.
In addition, the Court's decision was likely influenced by its fear of
the potential for vexatious litigation under section 10(b)'s implied private
right of action. More than three years after the opinion, however, the
securities laws have undergone a major revamping by Congress meant to

282. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
283. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.

284. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1,4.
285. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
286. See discussion supra Part II.B.6.
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alleviate this concern. In December 1995, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19 9 5." 7 The Act, which revised
both substantive and procedural law governing private actions under the
federal securities laws, was designed to address Congressional concerns
about the filing of meritless securities lawsuits solely for their settlement
value."'
In April 1997, the Commission submitted a report to President
28 9
Clinton and the Congress on the first year of practice under the Act.
While generally concluding that it is too soon to make definitive
assessments about the Act's impact, the report did make some observations tending to show that the Act is having some force. Traditional
"aiders and abettors," such as accountants and lawyers, were being
named much less frequently.29 Moreover, the report found that certain
of the Act's provisions-namely, the discovery stay and heightened
pleading standards--have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring
and prosecute class action lawsuits.29' The report also found that the
complaints
appeared to be specific to the action, and not cookie
292
cutter.
Coupled with the loss of aiding and abetting in CentralBank, these
reforms suggest that the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court and
the Congress about vexatious litigation under section 10(b) hold less true
today than when first enunciated by the Court more than two decades
ago.293 It is for these reasons that we believe that courts should contin-

287. See discussion supra Part II.A.

288. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
289. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997).

at 2.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
at 22.

293. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). Evidence also
exists that the problem of vexatious litigation was overstated prior to enactment of the Reform Act:

A perusal of... the 1993 Hearings on PrivateLitigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws by the Senate Subcommittee on Securities suggests that the [Central
Bank] Court's summary of public policy arguments was based on a mischaracterization
of available evidence. Between 1989 and 1992, according to testimony presented at these
hearings, an average of 123.5 consolidated federal securities class actions were filed per

annum. This means that less than one percent of the 17,400 companies that filed with the
SEC in 1993 have been subject to litigation in any given year. A substantial percentage ... were resolved by a judicial dismissal on a defendant's motion. These data are
hardly consistent with an avalanche of litigation against new and small companies ....

Seligman, supra note 16, at 1433-34 (footnotes omitted).
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ue to construe the securities laws "not technically
and restrictively, but
294
flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes."

294. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
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